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DANIEL KLERMAN* AND GREG REILLY† 
ABSTRACT 
Forum shopping is problematic because it may lead to forum selling. 
For diverse motives, including prestige, local benefits, or re-election, some 
judges want to hear more cases. When plaintiffs have wide choice of forum, 
such judges have incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff because 
plaintiffs choose the court. While only a few judges may be motivated to 
attract more cases, their actions can have large effects because their courts 
will attract a disproportionate share of cases. For example, judges in the 
Eastern District of Texas have attracted patent plaintiffs to their district by 
distorting the rules and practices relating to case assignment, joinder, 
discovery, transfer, and summary judgment. As a result of these efforts, 
more than a quarter of all patent infringement suits were filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas in 2014. Consideration of forum selling helps 
justify constitutional constraints on personal jurisdiction. Without 
constitutional limits on jurisdiction, some courts are likely to be biased in 
favor of plaintiffs in order to attract litigation. This Article explores forum 
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selling through five case studies: patent litigation in the Eastern District of 
Texas and elsewhere; class actions and mass torts in “magnet 
jurisdictions” such as Madison County, Illinois; bankruptcy and the 
District of Delaware; ICANN domain name arbitration; and common law 
judging in early modern England. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Forum shopping is frequently decried, but there is little consensus 
about why it is bad or whether the problem is serious. Some argue that 
forum shopping violates the rule of law, makes litigation unpredictable, or 
is unfair to defendants. Others claim it is harmless or even beneficial. This 
Article suggests that, in non-contractual settings, forum shopping is 
problematic because it leads to forum selling. For diverse motives, such as 
prestige, local benefits, or re-election, some judges want to hear more of 
certain types of cases. When plaintiffs have a wide choice of forum, such 
judges have incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff because 
plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff law and procedures. 
While only a few judges may be motivated to attract more cases, their 
actions can have large effects because their courts will attract a 
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disproportionate share of cases. For example, judges in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, likely motivated by prestige 
and the desire to benefit the local economy, have sought to attract patent 
plaintiffs to their district and have distorted the rules and practices relating 
to case assignment, joinder, discovery, transfer, and summary judgment in 
a pro-patentee (plaintiff) direction. As a result of their efforts, over a 
quarter of all patent infringement suits in 2014 and almost one-half in the 
first part of 2015 were filed in the Eastern District of Texas,1 in spite of the 
fact that this district is home to no major cities or technology firms. 
Consideration of forum selling helps explain the constitutionalization 
of personal jurisdiction. Without constitutional constraints on assertions of 
jurisdiction, some courts are likely to be biased in favor of plaintiffs in 
order to attract litigation and thus benefit themselves or their communities. 
While personal jurisdiction is often justified as addressing issues such as 
convenience and sovereignty, the danger of forum selling suggests that 
personal jurisdiction is also an important safeguard against biased judging. 
Since impartial judging is a key Due Process concern, forum selling helps 
explain why restrictions on state assertions of personal jurisdiction are 
properly addressed by the Due Process Clause. In addition, although the 
choice between federal districts is not generally of constitutional concern, 
the example of the Eastern District of Texas shows that even federal judges 
can be affected by forum selling. Therefore, it is wise that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and federal statutes usually restrict jurisdiction 
and venue for cases in federal court. 
This Article focuses on non-contractual litigation. Forum selling in 
contractual settings may be beneficial. When sophisticated parties use 
forum-selection clauses to choose the forum in their contracts, they have an 
incentive to choose a forum that provides unbiased, efficient adjudication 
because doing so maximizes the value of their transaction.2 As a result, 
states that want to attract contractual litigation would do so by offering 
procedures that favor neither side. Contracting parties seem to prefer to 
litigate in New York courts, and there is evidence that “New York’s 
dominance” is the result of “affirmative and successful efforts to induce 
parties to select New York as the provider of law and forum for large 
 
 1. See infra Table 1. 
 2. Whether forum selection clauses in cases not involving sophisticated parties are beneficial is 
much less clear. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243 (2003). Technically, the domain name dispute 
system discussed in Part II.C is contractual because the domain name owner agrees to it in its contract 
with the domain name registrar. Nevertheless, because all registrants must agree to the system, and 
because the system allows trademark owners to unilaterally choose the dispute resolution provider, we 
do not think this system results in unbiased, efficient adjudication. See infra Part II.C. 
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commercial contracts.”3 The methods that New York has chosen, such as 
the creation of a “commercial division” with expert judges and streamlined 
case management, seem aimed at providing efficient adjudication rather 
than plaintiff-friendly procedures.4 For similar reasons, when parties jointly 
and consensually choose arbitrators or a court after a dispute arises, the 
results may also be beneficial, even in non-contractual disputes.5 The 
potentially beneficial effect of competition when forum selection is 
consensual helps to explain the strong federal policies in favor of 
enforcement of forum selection clauses6 and arbitration.7 
The non-contractual, non-consensual situations analyzed in this 
Article are unlike those discussed in the previous paragraph because forum 
selection is unilateral. The plaintiff ordinarily chooses the court, so courts 
compete by catering to plaintiffs. While Todd Zywicki has noted that 
jurisdictional competition can be either “good or bad . . . depending on the 
institutional structure surrounding it and the incentives of the parties 
partaking in it,”8 this Article makes a much simpler claim. Jurisdictional 
competition may be good when parties mutually choose the forum, but it is 
very likely to be bad when one party, the plaintiff, selects the court 
unilaterally. 
A counterargument in favor of forum shopping and forum selling 
asserts that most courts and judges are inefficiently pro-defendant. If so, 
jurisdictional rules that give judges an incentive to be more pro-plaintiff 
and that allow plaintiffs to choose the judges who are more favorable to 
them could redress what would otherwise be an inefficient pro-defendant 
bias. However, the case studies in this Article suggest forum selling has not 
been beneficial. For example, most commentators argue that patent law is 
currently too strong and that patent assertion entities (known pejoratively 
 
 3. Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2073, 2098 (2009).  
 4. See id. at 2094–95. 
 5. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 87–96 (2009); Jonathan 
Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived 
Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1746–47, 1803 (2008) (suggesting that bankruptcy 
appellate panels, “by virtue of their structural features, would be perceived to provide a quality of 
appellate review superior to that of their district court counterparts”). Whether arbitration clauses in 
consumer or employment contracts are beneficial is unclear. Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Banks vs. 
Consumers (Guess Who Wins), BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. 72 (June 16, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2008-06-04/banks-vs-dot-consumers-guess-who-wins.  
 6. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593–97 (1991). 
 7. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1–307 (2012).  
 8. Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1141, 1146 (2006). 
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as “patent trolls”) are impeding technological progress.9 In this context, the 
Eastern District of Texas’s pro-patentee bias and particular attractiveness to 
patent assertion entities aggravates the problem and makes the law worse. 
Forum selling bears some resemblance to the competition for 
corporate chartering. Some argue that competition has led to a “race to the 
top” because corporate managers who choose the state of incorporation 
have incentives to maximize firm value by selecting the state with the best 
corporate law.10 While competition for incorporation may plausibly lead to 
efficient law, no similar argument can be made in the litigation context, 
except, as noted above, in contractual situations. The plaintiff generally 
chooses where the case will be litigated, and there is no reason to think that 
plaintiffs prefer adjudication that maximizes social welfare. They prefer 
courts that increase their expected recoveries and minimize their costs. As a 
result, competition among courts is likely to result in a pro-plaintiff bias.11 
To some, the term “forum selling” may have a negative connotation 
suggestive of corrupt, unethical, or otherwise wrongful behavior. That is 
not our intention. Rather, we use the term “forum selling” because its 
similarity to “forum shopping” highlights the relationship between 
jurisdictional choice, plaintiffs’ filing decisions, and judicial action. We use 
the term broadly to include all efforts to attract litigation to a court. It 
therefore includes socially beneficial efforts like those seen for contract 
litigation between sophisticated parties. In the non-consensual situations 
that are the focus of this Article, our claim is only that efforts to attract 
litigation are socially undesirable because they are likely to produce 
inefficient pro-plaintiff law. We make no judgment about the ethical or 
moral issues surrounding forum selling. For example, reasonable people 
could disagree about whether a judge who uses broad discretion on 
procedural matters in a pro-plaintiff manner to attract litigation has acted 
differently than a judge who does so because of ideological preferences and 
whether either or both of these are unethical or otherwise “wrongful.” 
These questions are not our concern. Rather, our focus is on the systemic 
consequences of forum selling. 
 
 9. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT 3 (2009) (“Patent owners—and the Federal Circuit itself—are beset on all sides by those complaining 
about the proliferation of bad patents and the abuse of those patents in court.”). 
 10. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 217–18 (1991). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The 
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1992) 
(arguing there is a “race for the bottom” in which “states are driven to offer rules that benefit managers 
at the expense of shareholders”). 
 11. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 1182–83 (2007); LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 241 (2005). 
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This Article explores forum selling through five case studies: patent 
litigation in the Eastern District of Texas and elsewhere; class actions and 
mass torts in “magnet jurisdictions” such as Madison County, Illinois; 
bankruptcy and the District of Delaware; the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) domain name arbitration; and 
common law judging in early modern England. Although these areas have 
been studied by specialists, their implications for personal jurisdiction and 
venue more generally have not been explored. For example, Lynn LoPucki 
wrote a book and a series of articles exploring the ways in which 
bankruptcy courts were being “corrupted” by their competition for cases.12 
Competition for patent cases is analyzed by Jonas Anderson, who argues 
that competition is particularly likely when courts are specialized and 
advocates random assignment of cases to judges as the solution.13 Mark 
Geist and Milton Mueller have examined competition among private 
dispute resolution providers deciding domain names disputes.14 
This Article builds on prior work that Daniel Klerman has done on 
jurisdiction and jurisdictional competition. In 2007, Klerman argued that 
loose jurisdictional rules in pre-modern England led to competition among 
courts and a pro-plaintiff bias in the development of the common law.15 
More recently, Klerman coined the phrase “forum selling” and identified it 
as a potential problem in modern litigation.16 This Article uses detailed 
case studies to show that forum selling is a reality in several areas of law. 
The major contributions of this Article are to show that forum selling 
is not restricted to one or two legal areas, that in non-consensual contexts it 
leads to inefficient distortions of substantive law, procedure, and trial 
management practices, and that it can be cured by constricting 
jurisdictional choice. Prior work has seen judicial efforts to attract litigation 
 
 12. LOPUCKI, supra note 11. See infra Part II.B.  
 13. J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 631, 683, 693 
(2015). Jonas Anderson and the authors of this Article conceived of their articles independently and 
only became aware of each other’s work in August 2014, when both had nearly complete drafts. See 
also Stefan Bechtold & Jens Frankenreiter, Forum Selling in Germany: Supply-Side Effects in Patent 
Forum Shopping (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 14. Michael Geist, Fair.com?: An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in the 
ICANN UDRP, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 903, 918 (2002); Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A Statistical 
Assessment of ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 INFO. SOC’Y 151, 152 (2001). 
 15. Klerman, supra note 11. This work, in turn, built upon the insights of William Landes, 
Richard Posner, and Bruce Hay, who noted incentives for a pro-plaintiff bias when plaintiffs have 
choice of forum. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 254–55 (1979); Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product 
Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617, 643–44 (1992). 
 16. Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551,1554 
(2012); Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245 (2014) 
[hereinafter Klerman, Rethinking].  
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as an anomaly peculiar to particular areas of the law, rather than a general 
problem to be considered in the design of legal systems. 
While this Article focuses on the implications of forum selling for 
jurisdiction and venue, forum selling also sheds light on many other 
phenomena. For scholars of judicial decisionmaking, it suggests that 
judges’ ideological preferences and desire for leisure may sometimes be 
outweighed by competitive pressure to attract cases. For procedure 
scholars, the techniques used by courts to attract cases while evading 
judicial review suggest that doctrines that restrict appellate review, such as 
the final judgment rule and the abuse of discretion standard of review, may 
encourage strategic behavior by trial judges. This Article also contributes to 
the debate over rules versus standards by suggesting that standards may be 
less desirable because they provide more leeway for motivated judges to tilt 
the law in a pro-plaintiff way. 
Part I analyzes forum selling in patent litigation in depth. Part II shows 
that forum selling is a potential problem in any legal system and in any 
legal field by briefly discussing class actions and mass torts, bankruptcy, 
domain name disputes, and early modern common law judging. Part III 
generalizes from the case studies, and Part IV explores possible solutions. 
A short conclusion follows. 
I.  PATENTS AND THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
A.  FORUM SHOPPING IN PATENT CASES 
Due to weak personal jurisdiction and venue constraints, a patentee 
can usually “choose to initiate a lawsuit in virtually any federal district 
court.”17 Until the late 1980s, venue in patent cases was rather restrictive,18 
but in 1988, Congress amended the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c), to define a corporation’s residence “for purposes of venue” as 
any district in which the corporation would be subject to personal 
jurisdiction, if that district were considered a state.19 Despite the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions questioning the “stream of commerce” theory of 
personal jurisdiction in product liability cases,20 the Federal Circuit has 
 
 17. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1451 (2010). See also Kimberly 
A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 889, 901 (2001). 
 18. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1957). See also Fourco Glass Co. v. Tansmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 
222, 226–28 (1957). 
 19. VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988)). 
 20. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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held that jurisdiction is proper if the accused products are sold in the forum 
state, whether those sales are made directly by the alleged infringer or 
through established distribution networks.21 Because most accused 
infringers are corporations whose products are sold nationwide, most patent 
plaintiffs can sue in any district.22 
Forum shopping in patent cases has been extensive since at least the 
late 1990s,23 but the Eastern District of Texas emerged in the mid-2000s as 
the favored forum,24 despite lacking major population, corporate, or 
technology centers.25 Outside the top ten in patent filings as late as 2003, 
the district surged to take the top spot in 2007.26 As shown in Table 1, the 
Eastern District of Texas had the most patent cases in six of the last eight 
years and the second most in the other two years. 
 
 21. Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565–69 (Fed. Cir. 1994); 
AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (asserting that “the 
law remains the same after McIntyre” and thus that Beverly Hills Fan remains controlling precedent).  
 22. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 43, 70 (2010); Moore, supra note 17, at 895. 
 23. Moore, supra note 17, at 901–07. 
 24. Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric 
Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 193, 204–05 (2007).  
 25. See infra Table 1. The Eastern District of Texas runs from the outer edges of the Dallas and 
Houston metropolitan areas to Oklahoma on the north, the Gulf of Mexico on the south, and Arkansas 
and Louisiana on the east. The Sherman Division includes Dallas suburbs like Plano and The Colony, 
but only a miniscule number of patent cases are filed there. See James C. Pistorino & Susan J. Crane, 
2011 Trends in Patent Case Filings: Eastern District of Texas Continues to Lead Until America Invents 
Act is Signed, PERKINS COIE 10 (March 2012), https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/ 
2/0/v2/2058/pl-12-03pistorinoarticle.pdf (showing Eastern District of Texas filings by division); PACER, 
https://www.pacer.gov/map.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2015) (providing a map outlining the boundaries 
of the districts in Texas). 
 26. See infra Table 1. 
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TABLE 1.  Top Ten Most Popular Districts for Patent Cases, 2007–2014 (% 
of Total Cases)27 










13% 11% 9% 10% 12% 23% 24% 28% 44% 21% 
District of 
Delaware 












5% 6% 5% 6% 6% 4% 4% 3% 2% 4% 
District of 
New Jersey 












2% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2% 2% 
District of 
Massachusetts 
2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 
National Total 2775 2573 2547 2769 3574 5454 6115 5077 3141 34,025 
These figures understate the Eastern District’s share of patent 
litigation prior to 2012. Patentees, especially patent assertion entities, 
sometimes sued several unrelated defendants in a single lawsuit, a practice 
far more common in the Eastern District of Texas than elsewhere.28 Ten 
percent of all patent cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas in 
2010, but 25% of all patent infringement defendants were sued there.29 
 
 27. Data was obtained from Lex Machina. LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com (data obtained 
on Aug. 22, 2015).  
 28. See Greg Reilly, Aggregating Defendants, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1011, 1023–25 (2014).  
 29. James Pistorino, Concentration of Patent Cases in Eastern District of Texas Increases in 
2010, 81 BNA PAT., COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 803 (2011), 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/PL_11_04Pistorino.pdf. 
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Congress prohibited suing multiple unrelated defendants in one suit in the 
America Invents Act, effective September 16, 2011.30 Subsequently, 
plaintiffs simply brought suits against individual infringers rather than 
against multiple defendants. Since plaintiffs’ preferred court remained the 
same, the Eastern District’s share of patent infringement cases soared to 
23% in 2012, 24% in 2013, and 28% in 2014.31 In the first half of 2015, the 
Eastern District’s share of cases again jumped significantly, with the 
district now handling 44% of the nation’s patent litigation.32 
B.  HOW DOES THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS ATTRACT CASES? 
While some attribute the Eastern District’s popularity to non-judicial 
factors, like a pro-patentee jury pool that values property rights or an 
uncongested docket,33 this Article argues that judges in the Eastern District 
have consciously sought to attract patentees and have done so by departing 
from mainstream doctrine in a variety of procedural areas in a pro-patentee 
(pro-plaintiff) way. Judges in the Eastern District have themselves 
acknowledged a desire to attract patent cases. For example, Judge T. John 
Ward, the original architect of the Eastern District’s patent docket, 
explained that “when I came to the bench, I sought out patent cases.”34 
While each of these procedural deviations may be capable of neutral 
explanation or justification in isolation, their cumulative effect tilts the 
handling of patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas in favor of 
patentees. 
The Eastern District’s use of procedural rules and discretion in 
procedural matters to attract cases is almost completely shielded from 
appellate review by the abuse of discretion standard of review applicable to 
most procedural decisions, the harmless error doctrine, and the final 
judgment rule.35 Some appellate judges, however, have taken notice. For 
example, Justice Scalia called the Eastern District a “renegade” 
jurisdiction.36 
 
 30. David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 652, 693 (2013). 
 31. See supra Table 1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Leychkis, supra note 24, at 209–15; Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade 
District”: Lessons for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 141 (2008). 
 34. Allan Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for its Expertise and 
‘Rocket Docket,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2006, at 1D. 
 35. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 677–81, 683–91, 703–13 (8th ed. 2012). 
 36. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
(No. 05-130). 
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1.  Hostility to Summary Judgment 
Perhaps nothing increases the patentee’s chances of a favorable 
resolution more than making it to trial. Patentees win over 60% of the time 
at trial.37 By contrast, only 29% of grants of summary judgment are in 
favor of patentees.38 As in other substantive areas, summary judgment is 
overwhelmingly sought by patent defendants.39 Thus, “a jurisdiction that 
grants many summary judgment motions is likely to be a defense 
jurisdiction, while a court that allows many matters to go to trial is likely to 
end up favoring the patentee.”40 
As shown in Table 2, judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant 
summary judgment at less than one-quarter the rate of judges in other 
districts. Only Delaware even approaches the Eastern District of Texas, and 
its summary judgment rate is twice that of the Eastern District of Texas. 
 
 37. John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1769, 1790 (2014). 
 38. See id. at 1778–79, 1785, 1788, 1790, and E-mail from David Schwartz to Greg Reilly (Sept. 
5, 2014) (on file with authors) (both sources identifying 542 summary judgment grants, 155 for the 
patentee).  
 39. Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1778–79, 1785, 1788, 1790, and E-mail from David Schwartz 
to Greg Reilly (Sept. 5, 2014) (on file with authors) (identifying 1296 summary judgment motions, 927 
(72%) sought by the accused infringer). 
 40. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 403 (2010). 
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Eastern District of 
Texas 
50 6421 0.8 
District of Delaware 76 4787 1.6 
Central District of 
California 
212 4478 4.7 
Northern District of 
California 
143 2673 5.3 
Northern District of 
Illinois 
82 2392 3.4 
District of New Jersey 68 1986 3.4 
Southern District of 
New York 
89 1819 4.9 
Southern District of 
California 
30 1135 2.6 
Southern District of 
Florida 
30 1124 2.7 
District of 
Massachusetts 
43 1013 4.2 
All Districts (excluding 
E.D. Tex.) 1490 40,364 3.7 
	   The infrequency of summary judgment is not just the result of fewer 
motions by the parties.42 The Eastern District is far less likely to grant a 
summary judgment motion than elsewhere. One study found that the 
Eastern District’s summary judgment motion win rate (26.2%) paled in 
comparison to other popular districts, like the Northern District of 
California (45%), the Central District of California (48.2%), the Northern 
District of Illinois (38.1%), and even the District of Delaware (32%).43 
Another more comprehensive study found that accused infringers prevail 
 
 41. See infra Appendix 2. 
 42. From January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2015, only 9.6% of orders regarding summary judgment, a 
proxy for motions for summary judgment, were from the Eastern District of Texas, even though the 
Eastern District accounted for 15.1% of patent litigation in this period. LEX MACHINA, 
http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). 
 43. Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws Patent 
Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316–17 & n.88 (2011) 
(analyzing data from 1991–2010). 
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on summary judgment on patent invalidity only 18% of the time in the 
Eastern District of Texas, compared to 31% nationwide.44 Similarly, patent 
defendants prevail on non-infringement motions 45% of the time in the 
Eastern District, but 62% nationwide.45 Unsurprisingly, the Eastern 
District’s hostility to summary judgment corresponds to a higher trial rate: 
8% of patent cases go to trial in the Eastern District of Texas, second only 
to the District of Delaware (11.8%), and far above the national average of 
2.8%.46 
Some suggest that the Eastern District of Texas’s hostility to summary 
judgment is the result of general judicial philosophy, not a desire for patent 
cases.47 Beyond any general antipathy to summary judgment, Eastern 
District judges are particularly hostile to summary judgment in patent 
cases. Patent litigants, but not other litigants, are required to seek 
permission before filing summary judgment motions via a five-page letter 
brief and are prohibited from moving for summary judgment if permission 
is denied.48 Moreover, Eastern District judges implicitly acknowledge that 
patentees are attracted to the district by the fact that they are averse to 
summary judgment, emphasizing that they “believe in trial by jury.”49 
Former Chief Judge Davis said he was “cautiously optimistic” about the 
future of the patent docket after the retirement of its architect, Judge Ward, 
 
 44. Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1784, 1793 (analyzing data from 2008–2009). 
 45. Id. at 1790, 1793. 
 46. Lemley, supra note 40, at 411–13 (analyzing districts with twenty-five or more outcomes). 
 47. Paul M. Janicke, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Now a Strengthened Traffic 
Cop for Patent Venue, 32 REV. OF LITIG. 497, 502 (2013) (“[S]ummary judgment as a tool of judicial 
disposition was somewhat culturally foreign in the Eastern District . . . .”). 
 48. Chief Judge Leonard Davis, Standing Order Regarding Letter Briefs, Motions In Limine, 
Exhibits, Deposition Designations, and Witness Lists, at 1 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=24456; Judge Rodney Gilstrap, 
Sample Docket Control Order & Sample Docket Control Order—Patent, 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=17; Judge Michael H. 
Schneider, Sample Patent Scheduling and Discovery Order & Sample Non-Patent Scheduling and 
Discovery Order, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=9. In 2015, 
Judge Gilstrap extended this requirement to dispositive motions prior to a claim construction order on 
invalidity for failure to claim patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Judge Rodney 
Gilstrap, Sample Docket Control Order—Patent, 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=17. This is significant because 
the Federal Circuit has endorsed resolving Section 101 issues on the pleadings prior to claim 
construction via a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See, e.g., OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 
F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015); id. at 1364–65 (Mayer, J., concurring). Judge Gilstrap subsequently 
loosened this requirement so that the parties need only meet and confer, not seek permission, before 
filing pre-claim construction Section 101 motions. Michael C. Smith, New ED Tex Tools for Handling 
Pre-Markman 101 Motions, EDTEXWEBLOG.COM (Nov. 11, 2015, 3:22 PM), 
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/2015/11/new-ed-tex-tools-for-handling-pre-
markman-101-motions.html. 
 49. Symposium, The History and Development of the EDTX as a Court with Patent Expertise: 
From TI Filing, to the First Markman Hearing, to the Present, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 263 
(2011) [hereinafter Symposium] (statement of Judge Leonard Davis). 
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in part because Judge Ward’s replacement, Judge Gilstrap, “come[s] out of 
the Eastern District [and] will have largely the same belief system,” 
including the “belie[f] in trial by jury.”50 
Hostility to summary judgment is particularly advantageous to patent 
plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Texas because juries in the Eastern 
District have a pro-patentee reputation. Patentees win 72% of jury trials in 
the Eastern District compared to 61% nationwide.51 The low summary 
judgment rate, coupled with pro-patentee juries, gives patentees substantial 
leverage in settlement negotiations. Thus, whether a case goes to trial or 
not, the result is more likely to favor the patentee. 
2.  Judge Shopping 
Patentees have the unique opportunity in the Eastern District of Texas 
to choose their judge. As one leading Eastern District practitioner put it, “I 
will say that there is something happening in the Eastern District that you 
do not have in the big commercial areas—lawyers generally know who 
their judge is going to be in the Eastern District of Texas.”52 
The norm in federal district courts is random assignment among 
judges within a district.53 Since 2011, the Patent Pilot Program has relaxed 
this norm in patent cases in fourteen districts. To increase patent expertise 
in the district courts, the program allows a judge initially assigned a patent 
case to have it reassigned to a judge who has chosen to hear more patent 
cases,54 with the reassignment random among all program judges in the 
district.55 Almost all participating districts have at least three program 
judges. Non-program judges also often decline to reassign patent cases.56 
Thus, even under the Patent Pilot Program, the odds of being assigned a 
particular judge are at best one-third and usually far less. 
In contrast to the random assignment norm, the Eastern District of 
 
 50. Id.  
 51. Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1793–94. 
 52. Symposium, supra note 49, at 257–58. 
 53. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a 
Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 246, 247 
(2012).  
 54. District Courts with Patent-Heavy Dockets, TEXAS LAW (June 8, 2011), 
https://law.utexas.edu/judicial-clerkships/2011/06/08/district-courts-with-patent-heavy-dockets/. 
 55. Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program: Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local Patent 
Rules, N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N BULL. 17–18 (Oct./Nov. 2013), http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/ 
Documents/Vogel.NYIPLABulletin.Pilot-Patent-Program-Reassignment-Rates-and-Effects-of-Local-
Rules.OctNov2013.pdf. 
 56. Id. (“Between September 19, 2011 and October 10, 2013, 5,681 patent cases were filed in 
Program districts. Of those 5,681 patent cases, 2,037 were initially assigned to non-patent judges and 
649 of those 2,037 cases were re-assigned.”).  
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Texas assigns cases based on the division in which they were filed, and 
plaintiffs can choose to file in any division simply by selecting it from a 
drop-down menu in the electronic filing system. Selecting the division 
effectively selects the judge because the Eastern District specifies ex ante 
via a public order the allocation of cases filed in each division. For 
example, at the outset of the Eastern District’s popularity in 2006, patentees 
filing in the Marshall division were told they had a 70% chance of being 
assigned to Judge Ward, those filing in Tyler a 60% chance of Judge Davis, 
those filing in Sherman a 65% chance of Judge Schell, and those filing in 
Texarkana a 90% chance of Judge Folsom.57 
Although aspects of this assignment system pre-date the Eastern 
District’s patent litigation boom,58 the Eastern District provided patent 
plaintiffs with even greater judge-shopping opportunities than other 
litigants. For example, according to the February 10, 2009 “General Order” 
governing case assignment, Judge Ward received 100% of patent cases 
from Marshall and Texarkana, but only 90% and 10%, respectively, of 
other civil cases.59 Since 2009, the assignment system has changed with the 
appointment of new judges and other factors, but patent plaintiffs have 
retained their unique ability to choose the judge with a high degree of 
confidence.60 As a result, over the past decade, a patentee filing in the 
Eastern District of Texas knew it had at least a 50% (and often far closer to 
100%) chance of having a particular judge simply by clicking on a 
particular division from a drop-down menu when electronically filing its 
case.61 
There was no particular reason why patentees should be given a 
choice of division, much less a choice of judge, as patent cases almost 
never have a greater connection to one division of the Eastern District than 
another.62 As noted above, patent cases generally have a tenuous 
connection to the Eastern District based on the sale of a few allegedly 
 
 57. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. General Order 06-13, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=1956 (Aug. 18, 2006).  
 58. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. General Order 98-5, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=2090 (Apr. 1998). 
 59. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. General Order 09-4, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=19368 (Feb. 10, 2009).  
 60. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex. General Order 11-2, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=20087 (Mar. 3, 2011).  
 61. The Attorney’s “How To” Guide for Civil Case Opening, TEX. E. DIST. COURT 4 (June 11, 
2014), http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=2353. 
 62. For this reason, some districts assign patent cases district-wide, even when they use a 
division-based assignment system for other civil cases. U.S. Dist. Ct. N.D. Cal. General Order 44, 
“Assignment Plan” § D(3) (amended Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/generalorders. 
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infringing products somewhere in the district.63 
Patentees have used their ability to judge shop. From January 2010 to 
September 15, 2011—when Judge Ward was receiving 75% of Marshall 
civil cases and Judge Davis 95% of Tyler patent cases—96% of patent 
defendants were sued in Marshall or Tyler,64 even though those divisions 
are further from the population centers of Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston 
than the Sherman and Beaumont divisions. In the three months after Judge 
Ward retired on October 1, 2011, patent litigation shifted overwhelmingly 
to Judge Davis,65 but then shifted to Judge Gilstrap after he was confirmed 
and gained the confidence of patent litigators.66 
The Eastern District has maintained its case assignment system despite 
contrary instructions from Congress as part of the Patent Pilot Program. 
Congress specified that patent cases initially “are randomly assigned to the 
judges of the district court,”67 but the Eastern District’s order implementing 
the Patent Pilot Program provides that “[p]atent cases, like all other civil 
cases, will be assigned to the division in which they are filed and in the 
ratios specified in this court’s latest general order regarding district judge 
civil case assignments.”68 
 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 20–22. 
 64. Pistorino & Crane, supra note 25, at 9–10.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Owen Byrd & Brian Howard, 2013 Patent Litigation Year in Review, at 2, 6, LEX MACHINA, 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/2013_Patent_Litigation_Year_in_Review_Full_Report_(MLex_Ma
china).pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2015).  
 67. Pub. L. No. 111-349 § 1, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 137 note) (emphasis 
added). 
 68. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Tex., General Order No. 11-11, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=20787 (Aug. 22, 2011).  
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This discussion of judge shopping reveals that forum selling is a 
phenomenon of competition, both among districts and among judges. Some 
aspects of forum selling, such as rules requiring permission to file summary 
judgment, are made on a district-wide basis. In contrast, it is particular 
judges who want (or do not want) more cases and who make the case-by-
case determinations, such as allowing joinder or consolidation, that make 
the district and/or their court more attractive. By allowing judge shopping, 
the Eastern District of Texas makes the judge-specific aspects of forum 
selling more visible. In addition, by allowing judge shopping, the Eastern 
District facilitates competition on the district level because those judges in 
the Eastern District who do not want to hear more patent cases do not have 
to do so, and so can consent to district-wide measures to attract patent 
litigation (such as patent local rules) without fear that they personally will 
have to hear more patent cases.  
3.  Loose Interpretation of Joinder Rules 
In the late 2000s, a popular tactic among patentees, especially patent 
assertion entities, was to sue multiple unrelated defendants accused of 
infringing the same patent in a single lawsuit.69 Suing defendants 
collectively allowed patentees to decrease their own costs and increase the 
coordination costs and strategic difficulties for defendants. It also allowed 
patentees to use one defendant with some connection to the forum as an 
anchor to prevent transfer by other defendants with little or no 
connection.70 Although one of us has previously suggested that defendants 
could benefit from being sued collectively,71 patentees’ own actions 
demonstrate that they perceived a significant strategic advantage from 
suing unrelated defendants collectively. On the last day before the effective 
date of a new statutory provision banning joinder of unrelated defendants in 
a single patent lawsuit, the most patent cases in recent memory were filed: 
50 suits against 800 defendants.72 
A plaintiff may join multiple defendants in the same suit only if the 
claims “aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of 
 
 69. Reilly, supra note 28, at 1024. Patent assertion entities filed 19% of patent cases but sued 
28% of defendants between 2000 and 2008. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: 
Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1599, 1603 
(2009). 
 70. Taylor, supra note 30, at 672–78. 
 71. See generally Reilly, supra note 28 (discussing benefits of multi-defendant suits generally, 
with particular reference to multi-defendant patent suits). 
 72. Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 687, 687 (2012).  
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transactions or occurrences.”73 The overwhelming weight of district court 
authority, subsequently endorsed by the Federal Circuit, held that claims 
against “separate companies that independently design, manufacture and 
sell different products in competition with each other”74 did not arise from 
the same transaction or occurrence, even if the products were accused of 
infringing the same patent and operated similarly.75 Rather, “an actual link” 
between the products was required, such as a relationship between the 
defendants, the use of identically sourced components, or overlap in the 
products’ development or manufacture.76 
The Eastern District of Texas, and a few districts following it,77 held 
that patent infringement claims arise from the same transaction or 
occurrence if there is “some connection or logical relationship” between 
the claims—which would exist “if there is some nucleus of operative facts 
or law,” such as allegations that the defendants infringed the same patent or 
had products that were not “dramatically different.”78 As a result, multi-
defendant patent cases became concentrated in the Eastern District. By 
2010, patent cases in the Eastern District of Texas had an average of 
thirteen defendants, compared to 3.9 in the Northern District of California, 
3.7 in the Central District of California, and 3.5 in the District of 
Delaware.79 
Congress responded in 2011 with the America Invents Act (“AIA”).80 
The AIA only permitted joinder or consolidation for trial if the allegations 
involved “the same accused product or process” and clarified that 
“allegations that [the defendants] each have infringed the patent or patents 
in suit” were insufficient.81 The provision specifically targeted the Eastern 
District of Texas.82 
Although technically complying with the AIA’s anti-joinder 
provision, judges in the Eastern District of Texas limited its impact. They 
ruled that the Act did not apply retroactively,83 and in contrast to other 
 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 74. Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 
 75. See, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1357 & n.2, 1359 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Pergo, 
Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 76. See EMC, 677 F.3d at 1359. 
 77. See id. at 1357 & n.2 (recognizing that the Eastern District of Texas’s approach was in the 
minority). 
 78. MyMail, Ltd. v. Am. Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456–57 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 79. Pistorino, supra note 29.  
 80. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (amending U.S.C. tit. 25). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
 82. Taylor, supra note 30, at 700, 704. 
 83. Maya M. Eckstein et al., The (Unintended) Consequences of the AIA Joinder Provision, 
AIPLA Spring Meeting (May 10–12, 2012), http://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/c4abf2b5-ac78-
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districts, continued to apply their lenient joinder standard to cases filed 
before the AIA.84 The Federal Circuit ultimately granted mandamus, 
holding that joinder of unrelated defendants was improper even before the 
AIA.85 In response, Eastern District judges consolidated cases for pre-trial 
purposes, which provides the functional equivalent of joinder until the 
point of trial.86 Since consolidated cases are largely managed like a single 
lawsuit, wholesale consolidation “relieves patent plaintiffs of many of the 
financial impediments that Congress [in the AIA] sought to impose upon 
them.”87 
4.  Pro-Plaintiff Management of Multi-Defendant Cases 
The Eastern District of Texas’s case management of multi-defendant 
and consolidated cases also benefits patentees. Eastern District judges often 
require defendants to file a single brief or present a single oral argument on 
crucial issues, such as claim construction, imposing the same page and time 
limits for the multiple defendants in aggregate as for the single plaintiff.88 
Recently, they have required the defendants to agree on a “lead defendant” 
for claim construction (or have one chosen by the court). The lead 
defendant must file a single claim construction brief addressing all shared 
claim construction issues, and other defendants may only file ten-page 
supplemental briefs limited to “additional” issues unique to that 
defendant.89 
Historically, the judges in the Eastern District also were loath to order 
separate trials for unrelated defendants, scheduling a single trial for 
 
4b18-8c65-8e02608284d8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0f8412f9-9d41-444d-8b47-
90e694a54abe/AIPLA_Joinder_Paper.pdf. E.g., Ganas LLC v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 154632, at *28–29 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2011). 
 84. See, e.g., Lodsys, LLC v. Brother Int’l Corp., No. 2:11–cv–90–JRG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31456, at *17–21 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 8, 2012); Imperium (IP) Holdings, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 4:11–CV–
163, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10333, at *6–14 & nn.2–3 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2012) (report and 
recommendation of magistrate judge). 
 85. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 86. See Jan Wolfe, East Texas Judges Test Joinder Limits in Patent Reform’s Wake, CORP. 
COUNSEL (Aug. 22, 2012); Multi-Defendant Joinder Under the America Invents Act: Much Ado About 
Nothing?, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/multi-defendant-joinder-under-the-americ-97136/. Other districts 
also consolidate related patent cases. Id. 
 87. Eckstein, supra note 83.  
 88. Data Treasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:05-cv-00291-DF-CMC (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 
2009) (order extending time allotted for hearing) (2.5 hours per “side” for claim construction hearing 
with single plaintiff and several unrelated defendants). 
 89. Michael C. Smith, Lead Defendant Designation for Claim Construction Purposes, 
EDTEXWEBLOG.COM (Aug. 14, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/ 
2012/08/lead-defendant-designation-for-claim-construction-purposes.html.  
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anywhere from four to eighteen defendants.90 In common trials, the Eastern 
District judges often gave the multiple defendants collectively the same 
amount of time to present their defenses as they gave the single plaintiff.91 
Defendants were thus forced to focus on common issues, rather than on 
potentially successful defenses peculiar to one or two defendants. Notably, 
former Chief Judge Davis raised the possibility of a single invalidity or 
inequitable trial for multiple unrelated defendants, even after the AIA 
prohibited consolidating unrelated defendants for trial.92 
The Eastern District’s case management procedures simplify the 
patentee’s case and reduce its costs, while at the same time increasing the 
required coordination and conflict among defendants, undermining any 
efficiency benefits. They also make it more difficult for each defendant to 
pursue individualized issues or its own strategy for common issues, 
preventing potentially persuasive arguments from being presented to the 
judge or jury. Finally, these trial management practices increase the 
possibility of jury or judicial confusion. A judge or juror may misattribute 
stronger evidence against one defendant to another defendant for whom the 
evidence is weaker or allow the larger revenues of one defendant to 
influence damages against smaller defendants. 
5.  Hostility to Transfer 
Patentees are unlikely to file in the almost always inconvenient 
Eastern District of Texas unless they are confident their cases will remain 
in the district long enough to obtain its benefits. The judges in the Eastern 
District have gone to great lengths to provide patentees this assurance. 
Prior to 2008, the Eastern District normally transferred patent cases 
only when a case involving the same or a related patent was presently or 
previously pending in the transferee district.93 Beginning in December 
2008, the Federal Circuit dramatically rejected the Eastern District’s 
 
 90. See, e.g., CEATS, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-120, at 6–7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 
14, 2012) (order denying motion for separate trials); Wi-Lan, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 6:13-CV-242 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2013) (order denying motion for separate trials).   
 91. See, e.g., CEATS, Inc. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10cv120 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2012) 
(order designating trial times); Wi-Lan, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 6:10-CV-521 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2013) 
(order designating trial times). 
 92. See Network-1 Security Solutions, Inc. v. Alcatel-Lucent USA Inc., No. 6:11-CV-492-LED-
JDL, at 7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2013) (order granting in part Defendants’ motion to sever) (“Are there 
some issues that should be tried first as to some or all parties, such as invalidity or inequitable 
conduct?” (emphasis added)). Consolidation would be allowed, if the accused infringer waived the 
protection of the statute. Id. 
 93. Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Patent Happenings, December 2009, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Dec. 
1, 2009), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=52cc121b-d1f4-4ad5-829b-
21dc66802091. 
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restrictive approach to transfer.94 Over the next several years, the Federal 
Circuit granted ten mandamus petitions ordering the Eastern District of 
Texas to transfer patent cases to other districts, even though the circuit had 
never previously used mandamus to order transfer.95 During this period, the 
Federal Circuit granted nearly 50% of mandamus petitions from the 
Eastern District of Texas, an astronomical rate for an extraordinary 
remedy.96 The Federal Circuit granted only one of nine mandamus petitions 
seeking transfer from other districts during the same period.97 
The Federal Circuit’s multiple mandamus orders to the Eastern 
District of Texas were necessitated by the district’s repeated efforts to 
evade or limit the transfer standard set out by the Federal Circuit.98 For 
example, in its first mandamus order, In re TS Tech, the Federal Circuit 
ordered transfer because: 
[T]here is no relevant connection between the actions giving rise to this 
case and the Eastern District of Texas . . . . None of the companies have 
an office in the Eastern District of Texas; no identified witnesses reside 
in the Eastern District of Texas; and no evidence is located within the 
venue.99 
In a subsequent case, the Eastern District sidestepped the import of TS 
Tech by weighing against transfer the fact that the patentee’s lawyers 
“converted into electronic format 75,000 pages of documents . . . and 
transferred them to the offices of its litigation counsel in Texas.”100 The 
Federal Circuit granted mandamus in In re Hoffmann-La Roche, finding 
that “[a] plaintiff’s attempts to manipulate venue in anticipation of 
litigation or a motion to transfer” should be given no weight.101 
Judge Ward subsequently gave significant weight to the patentee’s 
claim that its principal place of business was in Longview, in the Eastern 
District of Texas, even though the patentee was not registered to do 
business in Texas, shared its Texas office space with another of its 
litigation counsel’s clients, was incorporated in Michigan, maintained a 
 
 94. See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319–21 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 95. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 & n.8 
(2012).  
 96. Id. at 346. 
 97. Id. at 346 & n.10. 
 98. See In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1342–44 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (rejecting Eastern 
District’s distinguishing of TS Tech because fact witnesses in transferee forum were not “key 
witnesses”); In re Acer Am. Corp., 626 F.3d 1252, 1254–56 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting Eastern 
District’s distinguishing of Genentech because none of the companies are headquartered in the Eastern 
District, the nearest one being in Round Rock, Texas, 300 miles away). 
 99. TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1321. 
 100. In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 101. Id. at 1337.  
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registered office in Michigan, and was run by Michigan residents.102 The 
district court declined to determine whether the patentee opened its 
Longview “office” for venue or legitimate business reasons.103 In In re 
Zimmer Holdings, the Federal Circuit rejected this attempt to sidestep its 
prior rulings, finding that the patentee’s “presence in Texas appears to be 
recent, ephemeral, and an artifact of litigation” and that this “is a classic 
case where the plaintiff is attempting to game the system by artificially 
seeking to establish venue.”104 
Similarly, Judge Davis found a local interest based on his acceptance 
“without scrutiny” that the patentee’s principal place of business was in 
Tyler, where the patentee had office space and maintained documents, even 
though the patentee employed no individuals in Tyler, was operated from 
the United Kingdom, and had incorporated in Texas only sixteen days 
before filing suit.105 The Federal Circuit again disagreed, finding that the 
patentee’s connections were “no more meaningful, and no less in 
anticipation of litigation, than the others we reject.”106 
Despite the Federal Circuit’s intervention, the Eastern District’s 
transfer rate actually decreased after TS Tech, from 9% in 2000–2008 to 
5% in 2009–the first half of 2015.107 The success rate on transfer motions 
in the Eastern District also decreased after TS Tech.108 While either 
decrease could have a neutral explanation in isolation,109 together they 
suggest that the Eastern District of Texas has retrenched in the face of 
oversight by the Federal Circuit. 
Commentators have attributed the Eastern District of Texas’s 
reluctance to transfer cases to “[t]he court’s enthusiasm for patent cases, 
coupled with the restorative effect of patent litigation on Marshall’s 
economy,” i.e., forum selling.110 Even former Chief Judge Folsom 
explained the Eastern District’s popularity, in part, by saying that “a certain 
amount of assurance that a judge was likely not to transfer those [patent] 
 
 102. In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 1380. 
 104. Id. at 1381. 
 105. In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 106. Id. at 1365. 
 107. LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). 
 108. Paul M. Janicke, Patent Venue and Convenience Transfer: New World or Small Shift?, 11 
N.C. J. L & TECH. ON. 1, 24 (2009). 
 109. A decrease in transfer rate could indicate that TS Tech and its progeny deterred some 
patentees from filing cases in the Eastern District that lacked a relationship to the district. A decrease in 
transfer motion success rate could indicate that TS Tech and its progeny incentivized defendants to be 
more aggressive in seeking transfer and bring weaker motions. 
 110. Gugliuzza, supra note 95, at 378. 
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cases is obviously important from the plaintiff’s standpoint.”111 
Despite its resistance to transfer, the Eastern District of Texas does 
transfer a greater percentage of patent cases than other districts (6.8% 
versus 4.5%).112 However, patent cases in the Eastern District usually have 
no connection whatsoever to the district. As a result, transfer is often 
appropriate under applicable statutes, which prioritize the convenience of 
the parties. Other popular districts are located where patent defendants 
reside, such as Los Angeles, Silicon Valley, and Chicago. It is not 
surprising that fewer cases filed there are transferred. 
In addition, the most comprehensive study of transfer motions, 
covering 1991–2010, found that transfer motions were successful only 
34.5% of the time in the Eastern District of Texas, compared to over 50% 
of the time in other major patent districts.113 Studies focused on more 
recent years have suggested a higher success rate, though still lower than 
elsewhere.114 
6.  Refusing to Stay Pending Reexamination 
Reexamination is a procedure by which the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“USPTO”) reconsiders the validity of the patent and can 
result in cancellation of the patent, narrowing of the scope of the patent, or 
confirmation of the patent.115 Stays pending reexamination favor the 
accused infringer at the patentee’s expense. First, because reexaminations 
only consider patent validity, not infringement and damages, a stay 
necessarily delays even a successful patentee’s recovery. Second, 
reexaminations are significantly cheaper than litigation and postpone or 
eliminate expensive discovery, thereby reducing the patentee’s settlement 
 
 111. John R. Bone & David A. Haas, Interview with Former Chief Judge David Folsom of the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, STOUT RISIUS ROSS 2 (2013), 
http://www.srr.com/assets/pdf/interview-chief-judge-david-folsom.pdf. 
 112. See infra Appendix 2; Janicke, supra note 108, at 23–24. 
 113. Iancu & Chung, supra note 43, at 315. Among the most popular districts, only the District of 
Delaware had a similarly low transfer rate. Id.  
 114. See Chester S. Chuang, Offensive Venue: The Curious Use of Declaratory Judgment to 
Forum Shop in Patent Litigation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1065, 1086, 1095 (2012) (finding 48%  
success rate in E.D. Tex. and 53.2% nationwide for 2000–2008 in non-declaratory judgment cases); 
Janicke, supra note 108, at 22–24 (finding E.D. Tex. success rate of 38%  for 2006, 47% for 2007 when 
controlling for related cases transferred separately, and 31% for 2008, substantially lower than C.D. 
Cal., N.D. Ill., and D.N.J.). Notably, Chuang’s nationwide number includes only contested motions, 
whereas his Eastern District number appears to include all transfer motions, inflating the comparative 
success rate in the Eastern District. 
 115. Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent 
Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 382–83 
(2009). 
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leverage.116 Third, reexamination proceedings use legal standards less 
favorable to the patentee, including a preponderance of the evidence 
standard for invalidity (rather than the clear and convincing evidence 
standard) and a broadest reasonable construction standard for claim 
construction.117 Fourth, and relatedly, 75% of ex parte and 95% of inter 
partes reexaminations resulted in narrowed or cancelled patent claims.118 
Patent cancellation ends all litigation, and narrowing often has the same 
effect. Although an imperfect comparison due to selection effects and other 
differences between litigation and reexamination, only 43% of validity 
decisions in litigation resulted in invalidity findings.119 Ultimately, a 
forum-shopping patentee often will want a district in which it can be 
relatively confident that the litigation will not be stayed if the defendant 
files for reexamination. 
Motions to stay pending reexamination are granted over half the time 
nationwide,120 but are granted only about one-third of the time in the 
Eastern District of Texas.121 Perhaps deterred by this low success rate, 
fewer stay motions were made in the Eastern District (1% of total 2013–
2014 case filings) than in the District of Delaware (2.2%), Central District 
of California (3.4%), Northern District of California (11%), and Northern 
District of Illinois (5%). As a result, the Eastern District’s stay rate in 
2013–2014 was only 0.4% of filed cases, significantly lower than districts 
like the District of Delaware (1.3%) and Northern District of California 
(6.5%).122 
Once again, the Eastern District of Texas has resisted supervisory 
oversight. The America Invents Act instituted a special post-issuance 
 
 116. J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 
373–74 (2010). 
 117. See Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 317–18 (2013). A “broadest reasonable 
construction” increases the chances the claim will be invalid because it covers what is obvious or 
already exists. Id. at 318 (“During examination, there is no presumption of validity, and, thus, no goal to 
construe claims so as to preserve validity.”).  
 118. Alan W. Kowalchyk & Joshua P. Graham, Patent Reexamination: An Effective Litigation 
Alternative?, 3 LANDSLIDE 47, 48 (2010) (relying on USPTO data through June 2009). 
 119. Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1801. 
 120. Rogers, supra note 117, at 320 (citing several sources). 
 121. See Gardella & Berger, supra note 115, at 398 (citing reported cases from 1981–2009); 
Matthew Smith, Stays Pending Reexamination, PATENTLYO (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2009/11/the-following-guest-post-is-by-matthew-smiththe-grant-rate-of-
motions-to-stay-is-highly-judge-dependent-and-somewhat-less-ob.html (granting reexamination in 20% 
of cases in the Eastern District for 2008 and 2009). 
 122. Austin Champion, Stays of Litigation Pending Post-AIA Patent Review, KLEMCHUK 
KUBASTA LLP, 46, 48, 53 (Mar. 28, 2014), http://media.wix.com/ugd/99abb3_5fb5144d89 
784208a1f02dcb0eebe003.pdf (dividing granted stays by reported total case filings to reach results). 
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review for so-called “covered business methods” and expressly authorized 
district courts to stay litigation pending these proceedings.123 Although 
Congress did not mandate a stay, the legislative history suggested that stays 
should be issued in most cases.124 The statute reflected this by adding an 
additional factor to the normal stay analysis addressing the burden of 
litigation125 and providing a rare right to interlocutory review of stay 
decisions.126 Judge Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas issued the first 
ever denial with prejudice of a motion to stay pending a covered business 
method patent proceeding.127 In his denial, he acknowledged and rejected 
the conclusion of other district courts that the added burden-of-litigation 
factor was intended to make it easier for defendants to obtain a stay.128 The 
Federal Circuit subsequently reversed and ordered a stay.129 
7.  The “Rocket Docket” 
The most common explanation for the Eastern District of Texas’s 
popularity is its quick case schedules, or “rocket docket.”130 During the 
Eastern District’s rise in popularity from 2000 to 2007, the median time to 
trial in the Eastern District was only 1.8 years. This was the fastest among 
the five busiest patent districts and eighth fastest among districts with 
significant patent dockets.131 
Efficient and prompt dispute resolution is something to which the 
judicial system aspires. Yet a fast docket generally favors plaintiffs. Quick 
resolution allows the plaintiff to obtain a recovery sooner and at a lower 
 
 123. See Market-Alerts Pty. Ltd. v. Bloomberg Finance L.P., 922 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489 (D. Del. 
2013). 
 124. See id. at 496 & n.14. 
 125. See id. at 496. 
 126. See, e.g., VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 
2014) (recognizing “the AIA expressly created an immediate right of appeal of stay decisions . . . [and] 
gave us jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeals”). 
 127. See Michele C. Bosch, Eastern District of Texas Issues First-Ever CBM-Related Denial of 
Stay Without Leave to Refile, FINNEGAN: AMERICA INVENTS ACT (Feb. 3, 2014),  
http://www.aiablog.com/post-grant-proceedings/eastern-district-of-texas-issues-first-ever-cbm-related-
denial-of-stay-without-leave-to-refile/#more-1067.  
 128. VirtualAgility, Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., No. 2:13–cv–00011–JRG, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2286, at *6–7 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2014), rev’d, 759 F.3d 1307.   
 129. VirtualAgility, 759 F.3d 1307. 
 130. See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html; Pusey, supra note 34; Symposium, supra 
note 49, at 254 (statement of Mike McKool).  
 131. See infra Appendix 1(a). Here and elsewhere, “districts with significant patent dockets” is 
defined as the twenty-five most popular districts for patent litigation over the past ten years. The 
average median time to trial in these districts (excluding the Eastern District) was 2.1 years, with a 
range of 0.8 years (Eastern District of Virginia) to three years (District of Colorado). Nationwide, the 
median time to trial in this period was two years. 
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cost.132 Similarly, the threat of an early trial promotes a quicker settlement. 
The pressure on the defendant to settle often builds as trial approaches, and 
a fast docket means this pressure will build quicker.133 The plaintiff also 
has a strategic advantage from a fast pace because it can prepare before 
filing, and the defendant must play catch-up to develop its defense.134 As 
one commentator put it, “[s]peed kills defendants.”135 
Commentators sometimes assume that the Eastern District’s speedy 
time to trial was the coincidental result of natural factors like its small 
docket,136 the decline of products liability and medical malpractice cases 
due to tort reform,137 or the absence of criminal cases.138 To the contrary, 
the Eastern District made a conscious effort to resolve patent cases quickly. 
According to former Chief Judge Leonard Davis, the judges believe in 
“getting cases to trial quickly, firm trial settings, and not deviating from 
them.”139 They accomplished this through short discovery periods and 
other deadlines.140 
Beyond a general commitment to swift justice, the Eastern District of 
Texas’s fast patent docket was part of a concerted effort to appeal to 
patentees. Judge Ward, the original architect of the Eastern District’s patent 
docket, decided upon taking the bench in 1999 to “fashion a system that 
would attract even more intellectual property litigation” by relying on 
special patent rules with short timelines and “the generally high 
metabolism of the Eastern District . . . [to] attract[] patent cases that 
couldn’t be heard in other patent-laden districts in states such as California, 
Virginia and Wisconsin.”141 Similarly, former Chief Judge David Folsom 
explained that “what made East Texas a popular venue” was that “in the 
 
 132. Moore, supra note 17, at 908. See also Lemley, supra note 40, at 403 (“Because a patent 
usually expires after twenty years, it is a wasting asset; every year waiting to enforce the right in court 
is a year that the patentee does not have exclusivity in the market.”). 
 133. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 914–15. 
 134. Moore, supra note 17, at 908. 
 135. Mark Liang, The Aftermath of TS Tech, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 29, 44 (2000). 
 136. See Symposium, supra note 49, at 254 (statement of Mike McKool). 
 137. See Leychkis, supra note 24, at 209–10. 
 138. See Nguyen, supra note 33, at 141. 
 139. Symposium, supra note 49, at 263 (statement of Judge Leonard Davis). 
 140. For example, the disclosure process in the Eastern District’s patent local rules begins one to 
two months sooner than in other districts. See Travis Jensen, Infringement Contentions Summary Chart, 
LOCAL PATENT RULES, http://www.localpatentrules.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Chart%20Infringement%20Contentions.pdf. In the beginning, Judge Ward 
only provided four months for discovery, and even after the district became popular, parties had only 
nine months for discovery, compared to eighteen months in the Northern District of California. See 
Alfonso Garcia Chan, Proposed Patent Local Rules for Adoption by Texas’ Federal District Courts, 7 
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 149, 203–09 (2003); Leychkis, supra note 24, at 209. 
 141. Pusey, supra note 34. 
2016] FORUM SELLING 267 
early time period of those [patent] cases being filed, Judge Ward and I 
always tried to maintain a scheduling order that would have the case ready 
for trial within 18 months, maybe 24 months of the filing date.”142 
Unsurprisingly, the docket slowed as patent litigation became 
increasingly concentrated in the Eastern District of Texas. The median time 
to trial between 2008 and the first half of 2015 was 2.3 years, ranking 
eleventh among districts with significant patent dockets and third among 
the five busiest patent districts.143 The Eastern District’s median time to 
termination (e.g., settlement, trial, summary judgment, or dismissal) was 
similarly slower, ranking tenth among districts with significant patent 
dockets.144 
The slowing docket led commentators to predict that the district’s 
popularity would wane in favor of other, faster districts.145 The exact 
opposite has occurred: patent litigation has become even more concentrated 
in the Eastern District.146 In truth, the district remains faster than average, 
despite handling nearly a quarter of the country’s patent litigation.147 Nor is 
there any reason to think that faster districts would be able to maintain this 
speed if patent litigants suddenly flocked to them.148 
The Eastern District’s continued speed results from conscious efforts 
by its judges to maintain some semblance of a “rocket docket” by 
“allowing some limited discovery before there is a scheduling conference 
to help keep the cases moving” and “considering rule changes in order to 
 
 142. Bone & Haas, supra note 111, at 2–3.  
 143. See infra Appendix 1(b).  
 144. See id. Lemley attributed the Eastern District’s slowness to congestion. Lemley, supra note 
40, at 415. However, the Eastern District’s time to termination decreased as the district became more 
congested, from 312 days (2000–2007) to 246 days (2008–6/30/2015). See infra Appendix 1(a)–(b). 
Thus, time to termination appears to reflect the type of resolution (e.g., settlement, summary judgment, 
trial, etc.), not docket speed. The Eastern District has a slightly lower settlement rate, a significantly 
lower summary judgment rate, and a higher trial rate than other districts, all of which increase time to 
termination. See Iancu & Chung, supra note 43, at 317–18. For time to termination just of tried cases, 
the Eastern District is ninth among districts with significant patent dockets and second of the five 
busiest districts. See infra Appendix 1(b). The one district with a similarly high trial rate, the District of 
Delaware, also had a noticeably slower time to “resolution” than time to “trial.” See id.   
 145. Fromer, supra note 17, at 1483 (suggesting that the Western District of Wisconsin is an “up-
and-comer”); Lemley, supra note 40, at 404 (“Speculation abounds about the next hot forum for patent 
litigation—the Western District of Wisconsin? The Southern District of Florida?”). 
 146. See supra Table 1. 
 147. See id. The Eastern District’s median time to trial was 2.3 years between 2008 and the first 
half of 2015, compared to an average median time to trial in other districts with significant patent 
dockets of 2.5 years and a median time to trial in all other districts of 2.4 years. 
 148. Lemley, supra note 40, at 416 (“[I]f everyone moves to a fast district, it can easily become a 
slow district as a result.”). 
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speed the docket back up.”149 The Eastern District of Texas may even be 
maintaining its patent “rocket docket” and popularity at the expense of its 
non-patent civil docket, despite the judges’ claims to the contrary.150 Since 
2007, when the Eastern District became the most popular district for patent 
litigation, the median time to trial in non-patent cases has gone up by 
almost 40%.151 
Ultimately, the continued (and increasing) popularity of the Eastern 
District of Texas demonstrates that commentators have overestimated the 
importance of the “rocket docket” in attracting litigation. Speedy resolution 
is certainly a factor attracting patentees to the Eastern District. But speed 
alone does not appear to be determinative. The Eastern District of Texas is 
offering advantages to the patentee greater than just a potentially socially 
desirable speedy docket. 
8.  Discovery 
Discovery is the most significant contributor to the high costs of 
patent litigation.152 Discovery costs fall disproportionately on defendants 
because “the bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused 
infringer.”153 Thus, accused infringers often benefit when discovery is 
reduced or postponed; conversely, patentees often seek to expand and 
expedite discovery to increase the amount of information revealed, 
defendants’ costs, and their own leverage in settlement.154 Because patent 
assertion entities do not have commercial products and tend to have less 
complex business operations than practicing patentees, the asymmetry in 
discoverable information between patent assertion entities and accused 
infringers may be even greater.155 Notably, the Eastern District of Texas is 
 
 149. Samuel F. Baxter, Eastern District of Texas: Fair and Just Patent Outcomes for Plaintiffs 
and Defendants, METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL (Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.metrocorpcounsel 
.com/articles/8817/eastern-district-texas-fair-and-just-patent-outcomes-plaintiffs-and-defendants.  
 150. Symposium, supra note 49, at 266 (statement of Judge T. John Ward) (suggesting that he had 
two separate tracks, one for patent cases and another for non-patent civil cases, to prevent the patent 
docket from delaying the non-patent docket). 
 151. See infra Appendix 3.  
 152. See KIMBERLY A. MOORE, ET AL., PATENT LITIGATION & STRATEGY 156 (3d ed. 2008) 
(“Discovery is the most tedious, burdensome, and expensive part of patent litigation.”); Professors’ 
Letter in Support of Patent Reform Legislation 1 (Nov. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Professors’ Letter], 
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/25/prof_ltr_nov_25.pdf (reprinting letter from sixty law professors to 
Congress). 
 153. In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 154. See Leychkis, supra note 24, at 219. 
 155. See Professors’ Letter, supra note 152, at 1. 
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especially popular with patent assertion entities, as compared to practicing 
patentees.156 
In the Eastern District of Texas, parties must produce all documents 
“that are relevant to the pleaded claims or defenses involved in this action” 
in conjunction with initial disclosures and without awaiting a discovery 
request.157 This greatly speeds up discovery. Defendants must complete 
their document collection and production—probably the most costly aspect 
of discovery—within a few months of the case filing.158 The Eastern 
District’s rule puts the onus on the defendant to decide the relevance of 
documents, under penalty of sanctions, rather than on the plaintiff to justify 
the relevance of documents. The likely result is broader document 
production. The Eastern District of Texas judges themselves emphasize 
that standard practice in the district requires broader disclosure of 
information than in other districts.159 
Mandatory production of all relevant documents is not limited to 
patent cases and apparently pre-dates the Eastern District of Texas’s rise to 
prominence in patent litigation.160 However, the requirement is likely to 
have a larger effect in patent cases than in the other, less complex cases on 
the Eastern District’s docket. Patent cases already have high discovery 
costs.161 According to a leading Eastern District lawyer, the mandatory 
production requirement is perceived as particularly advantageous to 
 
 156. In 2013, 38% of patent cases filed by non-practicing entities were filed in the Eastern District 
of Texas. 2013 NPE Litigation Report, RPX CORP. 18, http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/RPX-2013-NPE-Litigation-Report.pdf. By contrast, 25% of all 2013 patent 
litigation was filed in the Eastern District. See supra Part I.A.  
 157. Sample Discovery Order for Patent Cases Assigned to Judge Rodney Gilstrap and Judge Roy 
Payne, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=17 [hereinafter Sample Gilstrap 
and Payne] (follow “Disovery Order – Patent” hyperlink under “Sample Patent Forms” heading).  See 
also Discovery Order, Chief Judge Leonard Davis, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=2191; Order Governing Proceedings, Judge Ron Clark 4, 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=2379; Scheduling & Discovery 
Order, Judge Michael H. Schneider, U.S. DIST. COURT E. DIST. OF TEX., 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info:judge&judge=9 (follow “Scheduling and 
Discovery Order” under “Sample Patent Forms” heading).  
 158. See Leychkis, supra note 24, at 219. 
 159. See Michael C. Smith, Things Not To Do Three Weeks Before Trial #1: Don't Produce New 
Documents, EDTEXWEBLOG.COM (June 22, 2011, 1:29 PM) (quoting Judge Clark), 
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/2011/06/things-not-to-do-three-weeks-before-trial-
1-dont-produce-new-documents.html. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Chief Judge Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 
(2011) (“Patent cases, in particular, produce disproportionally high discovery expenses.”). 
270 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:241 
plaintiffs in patent cases because “discovery in a patent case is at a different 
level than it is in other cases.”162 
The Eastern District maintains its discovery system even as Congress 
and other courts move in the opposite direction, delaying and limiting 
discovery in patent cases. Legislation pending in Congress would stay 
discovery pending claim construction and reduce the patentee’s ability to 
get some discovery.163 The then-Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit 
criticized the Eastern District’s discovery requirements at the district’s 
Judicial Conference, saying that “blanket stipulated orders requiring the 
production of all relevant documents leads to waste.”164 The Federal 
Circuit Advisory Committee also issued a model order that sought to both 
delay and reduce e-discovery.165 This order was intended to be a guide for 
district courts in developing a more limited, targeted approach to e-
discovery in patent litigation,166 and gained acceptance in many district 
courts.167 The Eastern District of Texas adopted a model order to address e-
discovery, but with “significant revisions” to the Federal Circuit Advisory 
Council’s model that require “a larger amount of disclosure.”168 
C.  THE MOTIVE FOR FORUM SELLING IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 
TEXAS 
Forum selling runs counter to conventional views that judges want to 
reduce their caseload,169 not attract more cases. In particular, judges are 
thought to dislike patent cases.170 Why have judges in the Eastern District 
 
 162. Symposium, supra note 49, at 265 (statement of Mike McKool). 
 163. See Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2013—A Discussion Draft, PATENTLYO (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2013/09/patent-reform-2013-1.html.  
 164. Rader, supra note 161, at 334.  
 165. Daniel B. Garrie, The Federal Circuit Tries to Change the Tune to the E-Discovery Dance, 
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 347, 347–48 (2012). 
 166. The model order was originally published on the Federal Circuit’s website but was 
subsequently removed out of concern that doing so suggested endorsement by the Court itself. See 
Jason Rantanen, The Disappearing Federal Circuit Advisory Council Model Orders, PATENTLYO (Aug. 
12, 2013) (including link to model order).    
 167. See Guy Eddon, The Mystery of the Federal Circuit Advisory Council’s Short-Lived Model 
Orders, 26 No. 5 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 7, 8 (May 2014), http://documents.jdsupra.com/c8daec93-
f470-4336-96f4-9352ba6bbf72.pdf. 
 168. Garrie, supra note 165, at 349. 
 169. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 
469, 476 (1989) (surmising that judges prefer to maintain a caseload that does not constrain leisure time 
nor the ability to exercise judicial judgment). 
 170. See Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents For The Twenty-First Century: Maximize Patent 
Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 499, 503 (1997) (“Faced with ever-more-crowded trial dockets and mounting 
pressure to hear criminal cases quickly, judges may understandably view patent trials as time-intensive 
and technically complex.”). 
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of Texas gone to such great lengths to attract them? We explore several 
possible incentives that might make forum selling rational. We do not 
necessarily suggest that these incentives are causing the judges to 
consciously skew in a pro-patentee direction. It is possible that the 
incentives subconsciously affect how the judges view the case, the issues, 
and the “right” outcome. 
It is important to remember that we do not claim that all, or even most, 
federal judges want to hear more patent cases. Our argument only requires 
that a few judges in the Eastern District of Texas want to do so. Loose 
jurisdiction and venue rules allow plaintiffs to bring a large fraction of all 
patent cases in the Eastern District, and the district’s case assignment rules 
enable a few judges to hear most of those cases. Thus, a handful of 
idiosyncratic judges can have a large, nationwide impact. 
1.  Interesting Cases 
The Eastern District of Texas judges attribute their efforts to attract 
patent cases to a desire for more interesting work. Judge Ward said he 
sought out patent cases upon joining the bench because he “enjoyed the 
intellectual challenge.”171 Former Chief Judge Davis said he adopted Judge 
Ward’s patent rules and tried to attract patent cases because he “wanted 
some interesting cases to work on.”172 Similarly, Judge Davis 
acknowledged, “I would rather handle interesting cases than uninteresting 
cases.”173 
Tort reform by the Texas legislature eliminated complex products 
liability cases from the Eastern District’s docket.174 Because it lacks major 
cities, corporations, or technology centers, the district did not have many 
other complex cases.175 Patent cases offered more interesting and 
challenging work. Because of the Eastern District’s case assignment 
system, patent cases were primarily handled by Judge Ward and Judge 
Davis, and subsequently by Judge Gilstrap, all of whom have expressed 
interest in patent cases.176 
 
 171. Pusey, supra note 34. 
 172. Symposium, supra note 49, at 256 (statement of Judge Davis). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 257 (statement of Judge Ward) (“Products liability dockets are gone and have 
started to change.”). 
 175. Id. at 256 (“Nothing would be worse than trying nothing but FELA [railroad workers’ 
compensation statute] cases.”). 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 57–61. 
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2. Prestige and Reputation 
An alternative, or complementary, explanation for the Eastern District 
of Texas’s forum selling is that the judges enjoy the prominence that comes 
from being the premier forum for patent litigation. The district and its 
judges have been discussed in The New York Times,177 the Supreme 
Court,178 and the halls of Congress.179 The judges, especially Judge Ward, 
are sought-after speakers at patent events throughout the country.180 These 
are not the type of opportunities normally available to judges in a rural 
district. Some suggest that Judge Ward “loves the attention.”181 
3.  Helping the Local Economy 
In New York, Chicago, or San Francisco, the idea that litigation could 
have a significant impact on the local economy seems far-fetched. The 
economies of rural districts are different. The economic benefits that patent 
litigation has brought to Marshall, Tyler, and elsewhere in the Eastern 
District have accrued both to the local bar specifically and to the public 
more broadly. 
Long before East Texas was a hotbed for patent litigation, it was a 
focal point for personal injury, products liability, and medical malpractice 
litigation, including major class actions against the asbestos, 
pharmaceutical, and tobacco industries.182 But tort reform by the Texas 
legislature limited the fees that could be made in those cases and, 
consequently, reduced the number of such cases brought in East Texas.183 
Local lawyers in the late 1990s and early 2000s were looking for new areas 
with more business and money. The patent litigation boom filled that role 
perfectly, allowing many local lawyers to keep earnings steady by 
transitioning their practices into patent litigation.184 
 
 177. Creswell, supra note 130. 
 178. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 36, at 10–11. 
 179. Taylor, supra note 30, at 704 (quoting Senator Kyl during debate of anti-joinder provision of 
AIA: “This provision effectively codifies current law as it has been applied everywhere outside of the 
Eastern District of Texas.”).  
 180. News Service, Ward at Center of Flight-Plan Change in Texas ‘Rocket Docket,’ SOUTHEAST 
TEXAS RECORD (Mar. 3, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://setexasrecord.com/news/217682-ward-at-center-of-
flight-plan-change-in-texas-rocket-docket. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See Creswell, supra note 130. 
 183. Alan Cohen, From PI to IP, IP L. & BUS. (Nov. 2005), http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_ 
district_of_texas/files/IP.pdf. 
 184. Id.; Creswell, supra note 130. But see Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: 
Yet Another Unexpected Effect of Tort Reform (unpublished paper) (on file with author). Avraham and 
Golden do not find a general relationship between states that enacted tort reform and a rise in IP 
litigation, nor do they find a relationship between courts that try to attract patent litigation and patent 
litigation filings.  Nevertheless, we do not consider these facts to be inconsistent with our thesis. We do 
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It is possible that Judge Ward, a former products liability lawyer, 
sought to attract patent litigation, at least in part, to help local lawyers 
struggling in the face of tort reform.185 Regardless, the practices in the 
Eastern District have benefitted local lawyers. Experienced patent litigants 
consider it necessary to have a lawyer from the specific town in which the 
case is pending (e.g., Tyler or Marshall) as co-counsel with national patent 
counsel, not just a lawyer from Dallas, Houston, or Austin who is admitted 
in the Eastern District. Local counsel normally play a larger role in the 
Eastern District than elsewhere, as a result of both local practices and 
official court rules.186 Judges in the Eastern District actively promote local 
lawyers, suggesting that “they’re a big benefit to the court because they 
understand our rules and what we expect, and they make the cases, I think, 
go much more smoothly.”187 They have said that they “don’t think national 
firms utilize local counsel at the trials as much as they should.”188 
Patent litigation is also important to the broader economy of the 
Eastern District. No less than the president of the Marshall Chamber of 
Commerce has said that patent litigation “is a big deal here, a really big 
deal . . . . And we’re glad to have it.”189 The manager of the local Hampton 
Inn described how 90% of his business one month came from the law firms 
trying a major patent case.190 The local Fairfield Inn bought a subscription 
to PACER, the docket system for the federal courts, to cold-call lawyers 
scheduled for trial and sell them rooms. The owner of a wine and specialty 
store attributed one-sixth of her sales to patent litigators, describing them as 
“definitely a huge asset.” Multiple local entrepreneurs renovated old 
buildings to rent office space and “war rooms” to visiting lawyers in town 
 
not claim that tort reform always leads courts to try to attract IP litigation, but rather that it did so in the 
Easter District of Texas. In addition, Avraham and Golden use adoption of patent local rules to measure 
efforts to attract patent litigation. This is a very weak way of measuring efforts to attract patent 
litigation because local rules are among the least important things that the Eastern District of Texas did 
to attract patent litigation.  In addition, the content of the rules matters more than their existence.  
 185. Creswell, supra note 130, at 8 (quoting leading local lawyer Sam Baxter as attributing the 
Eastern District’s patent litigation boom to the fact that patent litigation was where the money was and 
that there was a lack of good lawsuits for local lawyers).  
 186. See Sample Gilstrap and Payne, supra note 157, ¶ 9(b) (emphasis in original) (requiring “an 
in-person conference involving lead and local counsel or all parties” for discovery disputes); Cohen, 
supra note 183 (“Local firms often wind up taking the lead role at trial, becoming de facto trial 
counsel.”). 
 187. Michael C. Smith, Texas Lawyer–“Patent Law: Best Practices as Seen From the Bench” 
with Judge Gilstrap and Judge Payne–Part 1, EDTEXWEBLOG.COM (June 2, 2013, 6:40 PM), 
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/eastern_district_of_texas/2013/06/this-weeks-texas-lawyer-contains-part-1-
of-a-may-1-roundtable-discussion-patent-law-best-practices-as-seen-from-the-b.html (statement of 
Judge Gilstrap). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Pusey, supra note 34. 
 190. Creswell, supra note 130. 
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for patent hearings and trials.191 Corporations, like Samsung, that are 
frequently sued in the Eastern District have become “benefactors” of its 
communities, funding scholarships for local students, donating supplies for 
local schools, and sponsoring an outdoor ice skating rink across the street 
from the Marshall federal courthouse.192 
Perversely, the Federal Circuit’s transfer decisions have further 
benefitted the local economy. Patentees have attempted to manufacture a 
connection to the district by renting office space to store documents, 
opening actual offices in the district, hiring local employees, and even 
establishing or moving their entire operations to east Texas.193 
Unsurprisingly, the Eastern District has endorsed these efforts, despite 
inconsistency with Federal Circuit precedent and push back from the 
Federal Circuit.194 
It is doubtful that economic development was a motive for Judges 
Ward and Davis when they first decided to attract patent cases. The 
magnitude of the economic benefits would have been difficult to foresee in 
the early 2000s.195 Once the patent litigation boom started, however, the 
pressure on the Eastern District judges to maintain it must have been 
substantial. Many local law firms transitioned their practices entirely or 
substantially from personal injury to intellectual property and even hired 
new lawyers specializing in patent law.196 And many businesses were 
started or expanded based substantially (hotels and restaurants) or entirely 
(legal office space and “war rooms”) on the back of patent litigation.197 The 
evaporation of the Eastern District’s patent docket would “devastate 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Joe Mullin, Patent Troll Claims to Own Bluetooth, Scores $15.7M Verdict Against Samsung, 
ARS TECHNICA, (Feb. 17, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/02/patent-troll-
claims-to-own-bluetooth-scores-15-7m-verdict-against-samsung. 
 193. See Pusey, supra note 34 (“Office suites housing nothing but banker’s boxes and patent 
paperwork are not uncommon in Marshall.”); Dan Wallach, Patent Troll Case Lands in Beaumont, 
BEAUMONT ENTER. (Apr. 16, 2014, 8:44 AM), http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/ 
news/crime/article/Patent-troll-case-lands-in-Beaumont-5406545.php (describing patent assertion entity 
that opened Beaumont office with one employee for litigation reasons); William J. Watkins Jr., Does 
East Texas Hold a Patent on Predatory Litigation?, LONGVIEW NEWS-JOURNAL (Jan. 3, 2014, 10:00 
PM), http://www.news-journal.com/news/2014/jan/03/watkins-does-east-texas-hold-a-patent-on-
predatory/ (“A number of trolls claim East Texas as their headquarters and have set up Texas LLCs to 
ensure their cases are not transferred to another venue.”). 
 194. See Megan Woodhouse, Note, Shop ‘Til You Drop: Implementing Federal Rules of Patent 
Litigation Procedure, 99 GEO. L.J. 227, 229–30 (2010) (discussing Federal Circuit and patent forum 
shopping). 
 195. Symposium, supra note 49, at 256 (statement of Judge Davis) (“I, like Judge Ward and 
everybody else, thought we may have a few of these [patent cases] and it will be sort of an interesting 
thing.”). 
 196. Cohen, supra note 183.  
 197. See Creswell, supra note 130. 
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Marshall’s economy” and have dire financial consequences for many local 
lawyers and citizens.198 Whether consciously or subconsciously, the judges 
of the Eastern District—long-time residents of the towns in which they sit 
and former colleagues of many of the local lawyers199—likely would want 
to maintain the patent docket that had brought so much to their 
communities. 
4.  Personal Gain 
Finally, the judges in the Eastern District of Texas may have a 
personal stake in attracting patent litigation. The patent litigation boom 
likely has financially benefitted some of the judges’ family and friends. For 
example, both Judge Ward and Judge Davis have sons who practice law in 
the Eastern District of Texas and focus on patent litigation.200 Notably, 
Judge Ward’s son started as a personal injury lawyer, but his practice 
became almost entirely patent litigation as the Eastern District began 
attracting such cases.201 To be fair, Judge Ward’s son is a magna cum laude 
graduate of Texas Tech Law School and a former Fifth Circuit law clerk.202 
But whether they intended it or not, his practice, and that of Judge Davis’s 
son, presumably benefitted from the patent litigation boom in the Eastern 
District and their fathers’ prominence. Others close to the Eastern District 
judges also may have benefitted,203 though in small towns like Tyler and 
Marshall, separating benefits to the local community from benefits to the 
judges’ friends and family may be impossible. 
More directly, the Eastern District of Texas’s concentration of patent 
litigation provides the judges with lucrative financial opportunities upon 
retiring from the bench. Judge Ward joined his son’s firm, Ward & Smith, 
prominently highlighting his judicial experience to promote his practice. 
The firm’s website, for example, notes his ability to “conduct mock trials 
and [M]arkman hearings for clients in patent cases.”204 Perhaps 
 
 198. Nate Raymond, Taming Texas, AM. LAW., Mar. 2008, at 103. 
 199. Symposium supra note 49, at 256 (statement of Judge Folsom) (noting that Judge Folsom, 
Judge Ward, and Judge Davis all practiced in the Eastern District of Texas). 
 200. See THE DAVIS FIRM P.C., http://www.bdavisfirm.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2015); T. John 
“Johnny” Ward Jr., WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC, http://www.wsfirm.com/attorneys/johnny-ward/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Ward Jr. Biography]. 
 201. Josh Gerstein, Texas Judge’s Son Withdraws from Lawsuit in Fast-Running Odometer Case, 
N.Y. SUN (Aug. 29, 2007), www.nysun.com/national/texas-judges-son-withdraws-from-lawsuit-in-
fast/61550/. 
 202. Ward Jr. Biography, supra note 200.  
 203. See Creswell, supra note 130 (“In one patent case that eventually was settled, the plaintiffs 
hired an accountant whose clients included Judge Ward.”). 
 204. T. John Ward, WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC, http://www.wsfirm.com/attorneys/t-john-ward/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
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unsurprisingly, Ward & Smith had more open patent cases in 2013 than any 
other Texas firm and more than any firm with a nationwide practice other 
than IP powerhouse Fish & Richardson.205 Similarly, Judge Folsom 
opened, and is the only attorney in, the Texarkana office of the Texas law 
firm, Jackson Walker L.L.P. His firm’s website touts his judicial 
experience in patent cases to promote his significant involvement “with the 
firm’s intellectual property litigation matters” and “his practice on 
mediation and arbitration, specifically in mediating patent and complex 
commercial cases.”206 
Following his former colleagues into private practice, Judge Davis 
retired from the bench in 2015 and joined the Dallas office of Fish & 
Richardson to provide “strategic consulting in patent litigation and complex 
commercial litigation, in addition to handling case evaluations, settlement 
strategies, mock trials, and mock Markman hearings.”207 Fish & 
Richardson’s press release announcing the move specifically noted that 
during Judge Davis’s tenure on the bench, “the Eastern District’s patent 
docket grew from fewer than 10 cases in 2002 to more than 1,000 pending 
actions in 2015.”208 Finally, former Magistrate Judge Charles Everingham 
opened the Longview, Texas office of the international law firm Akin 
Gump (and remains the only full-time member of the office), again 
prominently highlighting his service in “one of the busiest patent litigation 
courts in the federal system” to promote his practice, “advis[ing] clients on 
intellectual property litigation matters, with a particular focus on patent 
litigation.”209 
Having three district judges retire into private practice in less than four 
years is highly unusual. Three judges are 25% of the district judges who 
served on the Eastern District in this time period.210 By comparison, of the 
2143 Article III judges (district or circuit level) who served over a forty-
year period between 1970 and 2009, only seventy-seven, or 4%, resigned 
or retired to enter the private sector.211 
 
 205. See Byrd & Howard, supra note 66, at 7. Several Delaware-only law firms also had more 
open cases than Ward & Smith. Id. 
 206. David Folsom, JACKSON WALKER LLP, www.jw.com/David_Folsom (last visited Oct. 23, 
2015). 
 207. Former Eastern District of Texas Federal Judge Leonard Davis Joins Fish & Richardson, 
FISH & RICHARDSON (May 18, 2015), http://www.fr.com/news/federal-judge-davis-joins-fish/.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Charles Everingham IV, AKIN GUMP, www.akingump.com/en/lawyers-advisors/charles-
everingham.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2015). 
 210. History of the Federal Judiciary: U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Texas, FED. JUD. 
CENT., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetCourt?cid=158&order=c&ctype=dc&instate=tx (last visited Oct. 
23, 2015). 
 211. Stephen B. Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges 
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Again, it is doubtful the Eastern District judges foresaw or intended 
the potential economic benefits to themselves or their family and friends 
when they first sought out patent cases in the early 2000s. But it is naïve to 
think they are unaware of the financial opportunities the patent litigation 
boom has brought. Nor would it be surprising if the remaining judges 
consciously or subconsciously wanted to keep these opportunities open, 
whether or not they ever ultimately pursue them, by retaining the district’s 
popularity for patent litigation. 
D.  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Eastern District judges and defenders of the Eastern District in 
practice and academia argue that the district has attracted so many cases 
because it provides predictable, consistent, fast, and expert justice.212 These 
neutral values should be as attractive to accused infringers as to patentees, 
and yet accused infringers filing declaratory judgment actions almost never 
choose the Eastern District of Texas. The Eastern District had only 2.5% of 
declaratory judgment filings from 2000 through the first half of 2015, 
despite having 15.1% of all patent cases. Declaratory judgment actions 
were 1.3% of patent cases filed in the Eastern District, far lower than the 
7.6% nationwide total.213 
In theory, some accused infringers that want to file their declaratory 
judgment actions in the Eastern District may not do so because personal 
jurisdiction in patent declaratory judgment actions is more restrictive than 
in patent infringement actions.214 Nevertheless, differences in jurisdictional 
rules cannot account for the low rate of declaratory judgment filings in the 
Eastern District. Even when the Eastern District of Texas is the patentee’s 
home district, accused infringers virtually never file declaratory judgment 
actions there.215 In 2012 and 2013, there were thirty-seven declaratory 
judgment actions filed nationwide in which all defendants (patentees) had a 
principal place of business in the Eastern District of Texas and therefore 
 
Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–13, 56, 64 
(2012). An additional forty-six judges left because of inadequate salary, other employment, or 
dissatisfaction. Id. at 13, 63. Adding these forty-six judges to the seventy-seven who left to enter private 
practice increases the percentage to only 6%. During this time period, fifty-three Article III judges 
resigned and seventy retired for these reasons. Id. The difference between resignation and retirement is 
whether the judge’s service entitles him or her to a pension. Id. at 10. 
 212.  See Iancu & Chung, supra note 43, at 308, 314; Nguyen, supra note 33, at 124, 136–43; 
Christopher P. Gerardi, Inside the Busiest Patent Court in America: A Discussion with Chief Judge 
Davis, FTI J. (Feb. 2014), http://ftijournal.com/article/inside-the-busiest-patent-court-in-america. 
 213. See infra Appendix 5. 
 214. For this reason, an accused infringer may have difficulty seeking a declaratory judgment in a 
district other than the patentee’s home district. La Belle, supra note 22, at 68–73. 
 215. See infra Appendix 5. 
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were indisputably subject to personal jurisdiction and venue in that 
district.216 Yet only two, or 5.4%, were filed in the Eastern District. By 
contrast, 25% (2730 of 10,987) of non-declaratory judgment patent 
infringement cases were filed in the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 and 
2013.217 Thus, even accused infringers who clearly could file declaratory 
judgment actions in the Eastern District overwhelmingly do not do so. 
Accused infringers do not share the Eastern District’s defenders’ view that 
the district provides speedy, expert, and unbiased adjudication. 
Moreover, expertise does not explain the Eastern District’s initial rise 
to popularity at the expense of districts with much more patent litigation 
experience at the time (e.g., Central or Northern District of California). Nor 
does it explain its increasing popularity even after institution of the Patent 
Pilot Program, which has fostered expertise in thirteen districts across the 
country. 
Finally, as many note,218 the plaintiff-friendly juries of east Texas are 
certainly part of its draw: patentees win patent trials 72% of the time in the 
Eastern District, compared to 61% nationwide.219 This is complementary, 
not contradictory, to forum selling. Favorable juries make it easier for 
judges to use discretionary case management tactics, like speedy dockets or 
denial of summary judgment, to create favorable outcomes for patentees 
that are insulated from appellate review. 
Ultimately, commentators are correct that predictability and 
consistency drive the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas. But it is 
predictably and consistently pro-patentee procedures and outcomes that are 
the attraction. 
Some have asked, “If the Eastern District is so plaintiff-friendly, why 
don’t all patent plaintiffs file there?” While there is no clear answer to that 
question, many patentees find it beneficial to sue in their home district, 
where juries may be more sympathetic and litigation costs lower. This may 
help explain why the Eastern District has a disproportionate share of suits 
by patent assertion entities. Because they do not make things, such entities 
employ relatively few people and are therefore less likely to benefit from 
sympathetic juries in their home districts. 
 
 216. LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). We reviewed 
every patent declaratory judgment complaint from 2012 and 2013 in Lex Machina that alleged that the 
accused infringer’s or infringers’ address(es) were exclusively in the Eastern District. In seven 
additional cases, one but not all defendants had a principal place of business in the Eastern District; 
none were filed in the Eastern District. 
 217. Id. 
 218. E.g., Iancu & Chung, supra note 43, at 300–03; Leychkis, supra note 24, at 210–15. 
 219. Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1793–94. 
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Three issues give us some pause in reaching a forum selling 
conclusion but ultimately none of them is persuasive. First, some of the 
pro-patentee procedures pre-date and are not unique to patent cases: e.g., 
the speedy docket, case assignment system, and broad discovery 
requirements. We note the possibility that these procedures were developed 
to forum sell for the mass tort cases that once dominated the Eastern 
District’s docket.220 Regardless, even generally applicable procedures have 
been modified to particularly favor patent plaintiffs, like the need to seek 
permission to file summary judgment motions only in patent cases or the 
patent-specific carve outs in the case assignment system. Other pro-
plaintiff procedures are unique to patent cases, like the resistance to stays 
pending USPTO proceedings. 
In any event, patent litigation is unlike other civil litigation in the 
Eastern District of Texas. Failing to adjust general procedures for the 
complexity of patent cases may be as beneficial as patent-specific 
procedures. For example, a speedy docket and propensity for jury trials 
may be desirable in a simple contract case but severely hinder the defense 
of a complex patent case. Mandatory, early document production is less 
significant when the documents are few or evenly spread between the 
parties, but provides patentees with significant leverage since document 
productions in patent cases are massive and predominantly from the 
accused infringer.221 
Second, a study of final judicial decisions by Lemley et al. concluded 
that the Eastern District of Texas was “not significantly more likely to 
produce patentee wins.”222 A more comprehensive study of outcomes in 
patent litigation by Allison et al. (including Professor Lemley) concluded 
that the Eastern District of Texas was “significantly more likely to rule for 
the patentee.”223 The latter study is more relevant because it included 
denials of summary judgment, which, as discussed above, are one of the 
principle ways that the Eastern District favors patent plaintiffs. 
Third, “if the court were unduly biased in favor of plaintiffs, one 
might expect frequent appellate reversals on the merits,” but some evidence 
suggests that the Federal Circuit “reverse[s] the Eastern District at about 
 
 220. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 
660–75 (1989) (describing special procedures adopted in Eastern District in 1980s for mass asbestos 
cases opposed by defendants and sometimes rejected by Fifth Circuit: e.g., shortening discovery time, 
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 221. See supra text accompany note 153. 
 222. Mark A. Lemley et al., Does Familiarity Breed Contempt Among Judges Deciding Patent 
Cases?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1121, 1139 (2014).  
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the same rate as it reverses other district courts.”224 Judge Ward has pointed 
to his low reversal rate to rebut claims of a pro-patentee bias.225 We 
disagree that pro-patentee bias necessarily correlates with high reversal 
rates. As explained, pro-patentee bias can be effectively introduced through 
procedural tools that are subject to less frequent and more deferential 
appellate review.226 In any event, a more recent study of the Eastern 
District’s reversal rate, covering 2009 through part of 2012, found it to be 
significantly higher than in other busy patent districts, with a reversal rate 
of 55.1% compared to an average of 37.8%.227  
E.  FORUM SELLING BEYOND THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
Although no other district has been as persistent or as successful in 
attracting patent litigation as the Eastern District of Texas, several other 
districts have tried, some with more success than they desired. 
1.  Former Forum Sellers?: The Eastern District of Virginia and District of 
Delaware 
Before forum-shopping patentees headed to east Texas, the Eastern 
District of Virginia was their forum of choice, though it only ranked eighth 
with 3% of patent litigation even at its late 1990s peak.228 The popularity of 
the Eastern District of Virginia was attributed to factors that are consistent 
with forum selling, namely its “rocket docket,” resistance to summary 
judgment, and increased chances of trial.229 The Eastern District of Virginia 
also offered the patentee early and quick discovery and a divisional 
assignment system that increased the predictability of the judge.230 Eastern 
District of Virginia judges promoted their approach to patent litigation to 
practitioners and touted it as a way to reduce litigation costs.231 Patentees 
flocked to the Eastern District of Virginia, congestion increased and the 
judges saw a threat to their unique reputation for expedient case resolution. 
 
 224. Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 
1838–39 (2013). See also Iancu & Chung, supra note 43, at 306–08 (discussing appellate affirmance 
rate). 
 225. Pusey, supra note 34. 
 226. See infra text accompanying notes 338–39. 
 227. Teresa Lii, Shopping for Reversals: How Accuracy Differs Across Patent Litigation Forums, 
12 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 31, 43–44 (2013). 
 228. Lemley, supra note 40, at 404; Moore, supra note 17, at 903–06. 
 229. Moore, supra note 17, at 908–14. 
 230. George F. Pappas & Robert G. Sterne, Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Virginia, 
35 IDEA 361, 366–69 (1995). 
 231. T.S. Ellis III, Quicker and Less Expensive Enforcement of Patents: United States Courts, 5 
CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING INT'L INTELL. PROP. 11, 14–19 (2000); T.S. Ellis III, 
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INT'L INTELL. PROP. 22, 25 (2000). 
2016] FORUM SELLING 281 
Rather than take steps to speed it back up, like the judges in the Eastern 
District of Texas did, the judges in the Eastern District of Virginia sought 
“to turn off the flow of [patent] cases”232 and “actively discourage litigants 
from filing patent cases in their district” by dismissing more cases for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, granting transfer motions in cases without a direct 
connection to the forum, and implementing a district-wide assignment 
system that eliminated judge shopping.233 
The District of Delaware’s share of patent cases has long exceeded 
what one would expect based on its general civil case filings or its location 
in relation to technology centers.234 As shown in Table 1, Delaware is the 
only district that approaches east Texas in its share of patent litigation and 
the only other district whose share has increased significantly in recent 
years. The District of Delaware has many of the indicators of forum selling: 
a low summary judgment rate,235 a high percentage of cases resolved by 
trial (the highest in the country),236 a quick time to trial,237 and resistance to 
changes of forum.238 The district’s small size—four allotted judgeships, 
with a vacancy for most of the past decade—provides significant judicial 
predictability. 
Interestingly, while patent local rules traditionally have been seen as a 
way to attract litigants, Delaware’s lack of such rules may have given it a 
competitive advantage in recent years. Patent local rules tend to produce a 
claim construction decision earlier in the case than in Delaware, and 
Delaware’s delay in claim construction may benefit patentees by increasing 
uncertainty and encouraging settlement.239 Statistically, patentees do 
significantly better in the District of Delaware than elsewhere, both in 
terms of overall case outcomes240 and final decisions by judges.241 Like the 
Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware is a small district with 
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 241. See Lemley et al., supra note 222, at 1139–40. 
282 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:241 
an active local bar, and judges seem to want to help local lawyers.242 As in 
the Eastern District of Texas, personal gain may be a motive for attracting 
patent litigation. Two judges (50% of the allotted judgeships) resigned and 
entered private practice in less than a decade, highlighting their judicial 
experiences to market their patent litigation practices.243 Former Judge 
Farnan joined his two sons who already were practicing patent litigation in 
Delaware, and their firm now is counsel (often as local counsel) in more 
patent cases than any firm with a nationwide practice other than Fish & 
Richardson.244 
In the face of soaring patent dockets (and perhaps the changing 
composition of the bench), judges in Delaware now seem to regret past 
efforts to attract patent litigation. Transfers and stays pending 
reexamination appear to be more easily obtained in Delaware than 
before.245 More significantly, the court commissioned a Patent Study 
Group that had an officially neutral charge of identifying “best practices” 
but was widely seen as aiming to curb abusive patent litigation by patent 
assertion entities and others.246 In response, Judges Robinson and Stark 
(but not yet Judges Sleet and Andrews) changed how they handle patent 
cases. Many, though not all, of the changes are likely to benefit accused 
infringers at the expense of patentees, including an emphasis on early claim 
construction, a ban on “plain and ordinary meaning” arguments for claim 
construction (popular among patentees), early disclosure of the patentee’s 
damages model, and presumptively treating related cases separately for 
purposes of scheduling.247 Patentees have gotten the message. Patent filings 
in Delaware were down 34% through the start of September 2014 
compared to the same time period in 2013. The decline began in March 
2014, when Judge Robinson implemented the Patent Study Group’s 
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Procedures.pdf; Presentation of Hon. Leonard P. Stark on Patent Study Group to Del. Fed. Bar Ass’n IP 
Section (May 13, 2014), http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/news/presentation-honorable-leonard-p-stark-
findings-patent-study-group. These changes were adopted by at least one but not necessarily both of 
Judges Robinson and Stark. 
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recommendations, with a further decline after Judge Stark implemented the 
recommendations in July 2014.248 Ultimately, Delaware handled 19% of 
the nation’s patent litigation in 2014, compared to 22% the year before. In 
the first half of 2015, Delaware’s share of patent litigation dropped 
precipitously, with the district handling only 8% of patent infringement 
cases.249 
2.  The Western District of Pennsylvania 
The former chief judge of the Western District of Pennsylvania said 
that the district wanted to attract out-of-state patent litigation.250 The 
Western District adopted local patent rules on January 1, 2005—the third 
district in the country to do so—despite ranking thirty-fourth in number of 
patent cases in 2004 with only twenty-three.251 In doing so, the district 
“was making a statement that it wanted more patent cases.”252 Likewise, 
the Western District pursued, and was chosen for, participation in the 
Patent Pilot Program despite hearing relatively few patent cases. The front 
page of the Western District of Pennsylvania’s website even has a specific 
link for “Patent Information”—the only substantive area with such a link—
even though patent cases constitute only 1% of the Western District’s civil 
docket.253 
Those associated with the Western District of Pennsylvania provide 
several motives for wanting to attract more patent infringement cases. First, 
more patent cases would provide employment opportunities for area 
lawyers as local counsel even in cases filed by large out-of-state firms.254 
 
 248. Brian C. Howard, 2014 Patent Litigation Trends in E.D. Texas and D. Del., LEX MACHINA 
BLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), https://lexmachina.com/2014-patent-litigation-trends-e-d-texas-d-del/. 
 249. See supra Table 1. 
 250. Molly Hensley-Clancy, U.S. District Court of Western Pennsylvania Attracts Patent Cases: 
Pilot Program Steers Out-of-State Suits Here to Address Growing Demand in Specialized Law, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 23, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/legal/2012/07/23/U-S-District-Court-of-Western-Pennsylvania-attracts-patent-
cases/stories/201207230211. 
 251. See Travis Jensen, Local Patent Rules: Patent Rules Made Easy, ADOPTION DATES 
http://www.localpatentrules.com/adoption-dates (last updated Nov. 2014); LEX MACHINA, 
http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). 
 252. Douglas M. Hall, Western District Patent Pilot Court Attracts Attention, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.pietragallo.com/keep-informed.php?action=view&id=272. 
 253. There were thirty-eight patent case filings from April 1, 2012 through March 31, 2013. LEX 
MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). In the same time period, there 
were 2686 total civil case filings. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: Table C, U.S. DIST. COURTS, 
(March 31, 2013),  
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2013/t
ables/C00Mar13.pdf. 
 254. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 250 (“The increase in the number of patent cases in Western 
Pennsylvania also will likely affect area patent attorneys.”). 
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Second, the Western District’s court clerk “predict[ed] that larger firms 
may also establish local offices in the area in the coming years,” which 
would benefit both the local bar and economy.255 Similarly, commentators 
have suggested that having a “sophisticated and experienced local venue to 
handle patent disputes should only serve to foster and support” the region’s 
efforts to develop its technology sector.256 Third, the former chief judge 
may have been motivated by the prospect of enhancing the reputation of 
the court.257 None of these motives are, of course, inconsistent with the 
idea that judges in the Western District of Pennsylvania also wanted to 
further the goals of the Patent Pilot Program—improving patent litigation 
by concentrating patent cases in a small number of districts where judges 
wanted to hear such cases and might have or develop expertise. 
These efforts have had no impact. Other than a bump in 2012 resulting 
from the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation transferring fourteen 
related cases to the Western District,258 the district’s patent filings have 
remained steady for the past decade, fluctuating between eleven and thirty-
nine per year, but with no apparent upward trend.259 
The experience of the Western District of Pennsylvania shows that it 
is not enough to simply tell patentees you want them; you also must give 
them something they want. While the district has signaled its desire for 
more patent cases, it has not skewed its procedures in favor of patent 
plaintiffs. It granted summary judgment at a slightly higher rate than 
average.260 Patentees won only 27% of decisions on the merits in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania,261 comparable to the national average of 
 
 255. Id.  
 256. Hall, supra note 252. 
 257. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 250. That article states, “Judge Lancaster said he hopes that 
the combination of specialized patent judges and rules will continue to attract more out-of-state cases to 
the area. The reputation of the local district court, Judge Lancaster said, could be greatly impacted.” 
While we think the best interpretation of these sentences is that Judge Lancaster thought the reputation 
of the court would be enhanced by an increased number of out-of-state cases, it is also possible that he 
thought the district’s reputation would be enhanced by patent local rules and participation in the Patent 
Pilot Program, irrespective of any change in the district’s patent caseload. 
 258. Charles Bieneman, Multidistrict Litigation Under The AIA, SOFTWARE INTELL. PROP. REP. 
(June 11, 2012), http://swipreport.com/multidistrict-litigation-under-the-aia/.  
 259. LEX MACHINA, http://lexmachina.com (data obtained is on file with authors). 
 260. The Western District of Pennsylvania’s summary judgment rate was 4.3, right in the middle 
of the top twenty-five most popular patent districts. See infra Appendix 2.  
 261. Pauline M. Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case 
Resolution Relative to Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. 
L. 451, 483 (2013). The same study shows a 38% win rate for patentees in the Eastern District of Texas 
and a 43% win rate in the District of Delaware. Id. The percentage of decisions on the merits won by 
the patentee was calculated using Table 6 by dividing the number in column a (claimant win) by the 
sum of columns a and b (defendant win). Id. 
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26%.262 During the period from 2008 through the first half of 2015, it was 
slower in time to termination than all of the twenty-five most popular 
patent districts and slower in time to trial than all but seven of them.263 The 
Western District’s transfer rate was lower than all but four of the twenty-
five most popular patent districts,264 but that is not attractive to patent 
litigants without practices and procedures that make patentees want to file 
there in the first place. 
II.  FORUM SELLING OUTSIDE OF PATENT LITIGATION 
Forum selling is not restricted to patents. This section briefly explores 
four other areas where forum selling seems to have occurred. These 
examples were chosen to show that forum selling has occurred in many 
times, court systems, and fields of law. The existence, techniques, and 
motives for forum selling in these areas are not as clear as in patents and 
would benefit from in-depth exploration. 
A.  MASS TORTS AND CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE COURTS265 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, there were persistent complaints about 
unfair administration of class actions and mass torts in state courts. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers seem to have disproportionately filed cases in a small 
number of districts, including Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson 
County, Mississippi. Richard “Dickie” Scruggs, the once-successful and 
later-jailed plaintiffs’ lawyer, referred to these places as “magic 
jurisdictions”: 
[A reason for the explosion of asbestos litigation] is what I call the 
“magic jurisdiction,” or jurisdictions where the judiciary is elected with 
verdict money. The trial lawyers have established relationships with the 
judges that are elected; they’re State Court judges; they’re populous 
[populists?]. They’ve got large populations of voters who are in on the 
deal, they’re getting their place [piece?] in many cases. And so, it’s a 
political force in their jurisdiction, and it’s almost impossible to get a fair 
trial if you’re a defendant in some of these places. The plaintiff lawyer 
 
 262. See Allison et al., supra note 37, at 1787. 
 263. See infra Appendix 1(b). 
 264. See infra Appendix 2. 
 265. This section is based primarily on Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Now Open for 
Business: The Transformation of Mississippi's Legal Climate, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 393 (2005); John H. 
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HARV. L.J. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2001); David W. Clark, Life in Lawsuit Central: An Over-View of the 
Unique Aspects of Mississippi's Civil Justice System, 71 MISS. L.J. 359, 369 (2001); Patrick M. Hanlon 
& Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525 (2007); David Maron & Walker 
W. (Bill) Jones, Taming an Elephant: A Closer Look at Mass Tort Screening and the Impact of 
Mississippi Tort Reforms, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 253, 277–90 (2007). 
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walks in there and writes the number on the blackboard, and the first 
juror meets the last one coming out the door with that amount of money. 
Now a lot of times those get set aside on appeal, like in Texas, for 
example. A lot of you folks have succeeded in electing a very 
conservative Supreme Court, that reverses a lot of these things, but in 
order to get there you got to find [fight?] it. It’s pretty tough to handle a 
hundred or five hundred million-dollar judgment; it ties up your credit, 
your company; stock gets a hard hit; and so they’re forced into a 
settlement. 
  There are probably a dozen magic jurisdictions around the country 
where this is really a dangerous thing. The cases are not won in the 
courtroom. They’re won on the back roads long before the case goes to 
trial. Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in there and win the 
case, so it doesn’t matter what the evidence or the law is. The jury is 
going to come back with a large number and the judge is going to let it 
go to the jury, often on punitive damages. The proliferation of these 
magic jurisdictions, where plaintiffs join together in large groups even if 
they’re not from those counties, is one of the reasons that the asbestos 
phenomenon has proliferated—the litigation has proliferated like it 
did.266 
The magic jurisdiction phenomenon is made possible by the complete 
diversity rule (which allows plaintiffs to prevent removal to federal court 
by joining a non-diverse local defendant, such as a retailer)267 and loose 
interpretation of personal jurisdiction rules. In many courts, it is sufficient 
for one plaintiff to have a connection to the forum for the court to take 
jurisdiction over all cases involving the same tortious action, even if the 
other plaintiffs had no connection with the forum. As a result, courts in 
rural Mississippi or Illinois have adjudicated cases involving plaintiffs from 
across the United States.268 
Such assertions of jurisdiction are doctrinally problematic. They seem 
to be based on the concept of “pendent personal jurisdiction,” under which 
a court with personal jurisdiction over one claim can also adjudicate closely 
related claims against the same defendant by different plaintiffs, even 
though the court would not have jurisdiction over the related claims if those 
cases were filed separately.269 For example, a New Yorker injured by Johns 
 
 266. Steve Hantler, Towards Greater Judicial Leadership on Asbestos Litigation, Civ. Just. F., 
No. 41 (April 2003), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cjf_41.htm. Accord Peter J. Boyer, The 
Bribe, NEW YORKER (May 19, 2008) (less complete, but possibly more accurate version of quote). 
 267. See YEAZEL, supra note 35, at 211. 
 268. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 265, at 395, 397–99; Clark, supra note 265, at 369. 
 269. See, e.g., Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atlantic Embroidery Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180–81 
(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining and adopting pendent personal jurisdiction); Klerman, Rethinking, supra 
note 16 at 289–91 (discussing and critiquing pendent personal jurisdiction); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, 
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Manville asbestos manufactured in Colorado and purchased and used in 
New Jersey, could not sue by himself in Madison County, Illinois.270 
Nevertheless, if a person who was injured by Manville asbestos purchased 
and used in Madison County brought a nationwide class action there on 
behalf of all persons injured by Manville asbestos, the court would take 
jurisdiction. Similarly, if a lawyer joined together plaintiffs from Madison 
County and elsewhere, then the court would take jurisdiction.271 Unlike the 
doctrine of pendent subject matter jurisdiction, which has been the subject 
of both Supreme Court cases and federal legislation, pendent personal 
jurisdiction has been analyzed in only one appellate court.272 
Some judges have been explicit about their desire to attract cases. The 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has a special Complex Litigation 
Center. In 2009, the President Judge, Pamela Pryor Dembe, told a legal 
reporter that “the court’s budgetary woes could be helped by reviving 
Philadelphia’s role as the premier mass torts center in the country,” that 
“we’re taking business away from other courts,” and that “lawyers are an 
economic engine for Philadelphia because out-of-state lawyers stimulate 
the local economy by eating at local restaurants, staying in city hotels and 
hiring local counsel.”273 To ensure that litigation benefits local lawyers, 
judges in the Complex Litigation Center are “very strict on requiring out-
of-state lawyers to have local co-counsel at every mass tort program 
meeting.”274 The center also adopted some controversial practices that were 
criticized as favoring plaintiffs. For example, cases were sometimes 
“reverse bifurcated,” which means that damages were ascertained before 
liability.275 That practice is perceived to favor plaintiffs because jurors may 
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be more disposed to find defendants liable after they have become 
sympathetic to plaintiffs by hearing testimony about the extent of their 
injuries.276 Another criticized practice was the consolidation of related 
cases, which was seen, as in the patent context, as making it difficult for 
defendants to mount individualized defenses.277 The Philadelphia Complex 
Litigation Center seems to have been a victim of its own success. The flood 
of cases slowed down the court and attracted critical press.278 In 2012, the 
court modified its procedures to curb reverse bifurcation and restrict 
consolidation; soon thereafter, filings dropped by 70%.279 
Judges in magnet jurisdictions use a variety of techniques to make 
their courts attractive to plaintiffs. Many are very similar to those used in 
the Eastern District of Texas, including broad interpretation of joinder 
rules,280 reluctance to grant summary judgment or other dispositive 
motions,281 trial management and scheduling that disadvantages 
defendants,282 refusal to dismiss cases on forum non conveniens,283 and 
venue rules that allow plaintiffs to choose their preferred courthouse.284 In 
addition, because state courts have more latitude over substantive and 
evidentiary law, judges in magnet jurisdictions also make their courts more 
attractive to plaintiffs through doctrines that facilitate punitive damages and 
that allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to present expert testimony that would flunk 
the Daubert test. Here’s a vivid description of litigation before a judge in 
Madison County, Illinois: 
[T]he judge to which all asbestos cases were assigned, Nicholas Byron, 
implemented a system that made a fair trial almost impossible. The court 
routinely denied pre-trial dispositive motions, often without troubling to 
receive a written opposition from the plaintiffs. It refused to require 
plaintiffs either to plead or to provide in discovery information necessary 
for the defense of the case. While failing to enforce plaintiffs’ discovery 
obligations in any meaningful way, it very readily limited the defense of 
the case for technical discovery violations. The sheer number of major 
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cases set for trial—in 2003, more mesothelioma cases were set for trial 
in Madison County than in New York City—and the speed with which 
cases got to trial overwhelmed the ability of defendants to prepare each 
case. Also, the court frequently set several cases for trial on the same 
day, allowing the plaintiffs’ attorney to select the one that would 
proceed. The defendants could not prepare for every case and were not 
willing to bet on picking out the one that would go to trial. All of this led 
to one conclusion: cases in Madison County simply had to be settled, no 
matter what the cost.285 
Whether such practices are typical (or even accurately described) is 
unfortunately difficult to know. There have been very few rigorous 
empirical studies about magnet jurisdictions, and most of them have been 
produced by lawyers who routinely represent defendants. 
Why would judges so tilt the scales of justice toward plaintiffs? As in 
the Eastern District of Texas, two motives seem to be related to the special 
social and economic dynamics of rural districts: cozy relations between 
bench and bar, and a desire to help the local economy. In addition, because 
these are state courts, two other considerations are relevant: judicial 
elections and local county finance. Judges in magnet jurisdictions tend to 
be elected, and before the mid-2000s, the plaintiffs’ bar played a dominant 
role in financing judicial campaigns. In addition, some counties (like 
Delaware in the corporate chartering area) seem to have received a 
substantial fraction of their revenue from court fees generated by litigants 
who primarily hailed from out of state. 
One way that state courts attract class action litigation is by their 
willingness to allow settlements that benefit plaintiffs’ lawyers and 
defendants, but not plaintiffs. Litigation against General Motors (“GM”) 
relating to alleged defects in truck fuel tanks provides a vivid illustration.286 
The lawyers negotiated a settlement and then asked for class certification 
and approval of the settlement. A federal district court certified the class 
and approved the settlement, but the Third Circuit reversed because it 
found that the plaintiffs’ lawyers had failed to adequately represent the 
class and that the settlement was unfair because it consisted primarily of 
$1000 coupons for future purchases of GM trucks.287 The Third Circuit 
also criticized the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ $9.5 million fee.288 The parties 
thereafter shifted their litigation from federal court to Louisiana state court, 
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where essentially the same class action was certified and the same 
settlement approved.289 
In the early 2000s, some states began tightening their rules. For 
example, business interests financed the campaigns of judicial and 
legislative candidates who enacted reforms that curbed some of the worst 
abuses. Hearings on the Class Action Fairness Act highlighted the problem 
of magnet jurisdictions, and Congress responded in 2005 by passing that 
Act, which relaxed the complete diversity requirement in class actions, thus 
allowing defendants to remove such cases to federal court. Because federal 
courts have been much less hospitable to class actions (especially 
nationwide class actions based on state law), federal jurisdiction was seen 
as a cure to the problem. Whether that turns out to be the case depends on 
whether plaintiffs’ lawyers are able to exploit loopholes in the Act and on 
whether federal districts emerge that try to attract plaintiffs through 
expansive interpretations of pendent personal jurisdiction and practices 
used in patent litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, such as reluctance 
to grant dispositive motions.290 In addition, while the Class Action Fairness 
Act curbs state court jurisdiction over class actions, it leaves largely 
untouched state court jurisdiction over mass torts brought as joined 
claims.291 
As with patent litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, the 
management of class actions and mass torts in state courts has its 
defenders. Some members of Congress challenged the existence of magnet 
jurisdictions during hearings on the Class Action Fairness Act, and some 
academics have defended Madison County, although the best research 
focused on medical malpractice rather than class actions or mass torts.292 
As noted above, there is little rigorous empirical work in this area, so it is 
hard to be sure. Nevertheless, if critics of magnet jurisdictions are correct, 
class actions and mass torts in state court provide a vivid example of forum 
selling with striking parallels to patent litigation. Although the 
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overwhelming majority of state court judges discharge their responsibilities 
even-handedly, a small number of judges in a handful of districts have been 
able to exercise disproportionate influence by twisting the law to favor 
plaintiffs who have the power to choose their courts and thus bestow 
benefits on the judges, the local bar, and nearby economy more generally. 
B.  BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy is probably the area in which court competition has been 
most extensively studied and debated. Starting in 1999, Lynn LoPucki and 
distinguished co-authors, including Theodore Eisenberg and Joe Doherty, 
wrote a series of articles on the topic. In 2005, LoPucki published a book 
that synthesized his arguments. The following passage from the book 
summarizes his main argument: 
In 1974 and 1975 the Bankruptcy Rules Committee adopted venue rules 
that gave big bankrupt companies a wide choice of courts. In so doing, 
the committee inadvertently triggered court competition. Forum 
shopping was a modest 20 percent to 40 percent during the first 15 years 
after the rules were adopted . . . .  
 The sleepy, one-judge Delaware court that had attracted not a single 
big case in the decade of the 1980s entered the competition in 1990. It 
did so by ripping the Continental Airlines case out of the jaws of the 
Houston bankruptcy court and flaying Continental’s secured creditors 
and lessors. Impressed with what they saw, the case placers brought the 
Delaware court more. By the end of 1996, the Delaware court had 87 
percent of the big-case bankruptcy market nationwide. The results of 
Delaware’s reorganizations were disastrous. Depending on how one 
measured, the Delaware-reorganized companies were two to ten times as 
likely to fail as companies reorganized in other courts (i.e. courts other 
than Delaware and New York). The apparent causes of the high failure 
rates were the very same reasons the case placers chose Delaware: speed 
of proceedings and the judges’ willingness to approve whatever the 
debtor and its allies proposed . . . .  
  [To attract cases, courts] authorized larger fees for bankruptcy 
professionals and relaxed their conflict of interest standards. Instead of 
squeezing failed executives out, the courts allowed more of them to stay 
and even approved multimillion-dollar bonuses to “retain” them. Instead 
of reorganizing companies—which required full disclosure to 
creditors—managers took to selling their companies to investors who 
would hire the managers to continue running them and give the 
managers as much as 5 to 10 percent of the equity. The courts approved 
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the deals even when the prices offered were apparently inadequate and 
only a single bidder showed up for the auction.293  
In many ways, the story told by LoPucki for bankruptcy is strikingly 
similar to the argument made above for patent litigation. Jurisdictional 
choice led some judges to compete for cases and the result was inefficient 
law. Even some of the techniques were similar. Like judges in the Eastern 
District of Texas, Delaware bankruptcy judges devised non-random case 
assignment procedures that allowed parties to shop for judges.294 Like the 
Eastern District of Texas, Delaware bankruptcy judges created speedy 
procedures that favored the party who chose the court (and thus could plan 
ahead), and structured decisions in ways that insulated them from appellate 
review.295 In addition, the motives to attract cases were remarkably similar: 
increased status and power for the judges and more business for local 
lawyers.296 It is also interesting that the District of Delaware, the court 
which most aggressively courted bankruptcy cases, was also, at least for a 
time, a participant in the competition for patent litigation. 
Many aspects of forum selling, however, are unique to the bankruptcy 
context. For example, bankruptcy cases are not started by a plaintiff, but 
rather are usually initiated by the debtor company itself.297 LoPucki calls 
those with the power to choose where the company files bankruptcy “case 
placers.” Those people include “lawyers, corporate executives, banks, and 
investment bankers.”298 In most of his book, LoPucki emphasizes the role 
that corporate executives and their lawyers play in choosing the court. 
Thus, to attract cases, the bankruptcy court must favor the company and its 
management rather than those one might ordinarily consider plaintiffs in 
the bankruptcy process (e.g., creditors). 
Another unique aspect of bankruptcy competition is that the venue 
statute is, on its face, restrictive. Cases can be filed only where the 
corporation has its “domicile, residence, [or] principal place of business” or 
where there is a pending case concerning a corporate “affiliate.”299 
Nevertheless, this statute effectively gives large debtors the ability to file 
anywhere because companies choose where they are incorporated and 
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headquartered and can change those locations if it suits them. Bankruptcy 
courts themselves determine where the “principal place of business” is, and 
if they want to hear the case, they can be convinced that the firm is 
headquartered where the CEO happens to live and has a small office or in 
office suites rented for the purpose of establishing residence for bankruptcy 
purposes.300 In addition, most large corporations have many subsidiary 
“affiliates.”301 By forcing a subsidiary located in one location to file for 
bankruptcy first, the parent and all other subsidiaries can then file in that 
same place. 
Another aspect of bankruptcy litigation that is different from patent is 
that bankruptcy judges do not have life tenure. They are appointed for 
fourteen-year terms. When the judge is up for renewal, the “committee that 
passes on reappointments will probably survey the members of the local 
bankruptcy bar regarding the quality of the judge’s prior service.”302 The 
reappointment process for bankruptcy judges, like the fact that state court 
judges in “magic jurisdictions” are elected, gives bankruptcy judges an 
additional reason to attract cases and thus keep the bar happy. 
The wide range of decisions made by bankruptcy judges also gives 
them an extremely broad set of tools with which to attract cases, including 
awarding high fees to bankruptcy lawyers, paying lawyers every thirty days 
rather than according to the 120 day default set by the Bankruptcy Code, 
allowing managers to retain their jobs by not appointing bankruptcy 
trustees to run companies, paying retention bonuses to corporate 
executives, and releasing executives from personal liability.303 
When lawyers and judges in other states noticed that most large 
bankruptcies were filed in Delaware, they set up committees to figure out 
how to attract cases to their courts (or at least to ensure that local 
companies filed for bankruptcy in their courts).304 Those committees 
usually recommended paying lawyers higher fees and other practices 
pioneered by Delaware. If judges in those courts failed to follow Delaware 
practices, case placers would stop filing in their districts.305 The Southern 
District of New York has been especially successful in competing with 
Delaware; although the District of Delaware remained the most popular 
district for large bankruptcy cases in the period from 2007 to 2012, the 
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Southern District of New York had almost as many.306 Nevertheless, the 
fact that two courts now dominate rather than one does not alter LoPucki’s 
principal point: that courts have competed to attract cases. 
Delaware also developed ingenious strategies for dealing with the 
large number of bankruptcies filed there. Instead of transferring cases to 
other districts, Delaware invited bankruptcy judges from other districts to 
sit as “visiting judges.” Of course, doing so was risky because those judges 
might not follow the practices that made Delaware so attractive in the first 
place. Nevertheless, if a visiting judge failed to follow Delaware 
practices—for example, if the judge proposed transferring a case to another 
district or not confirming a reorganization plan—the case was swiftly 
reassigned to another judge.307 As one visiting judge explained: 
[Y]ou have to be fair to the district judges, too. It’s their district. It’s an 
economic thing. A lot of money flows to Delaware because of these 
cases. It supports a cottage industry of local counsel. The money goes to 
everything from cabs, to the train station, to hotels. You can’t get a hotel 
room there some nights, and who goes to Delaware? It’s very important 
to them. You’ve got to look at all sides. As a visiting judge, you have to 
be sensitive to the local culture.308  
LoPucki argues that the competition for cases was bad public policy. 
It meant that more of the firm’s assets went to pay lawyer and professional 
fees, and less went to pay creditors. It meant that managers whose 
incompetence and fraud drove companies into bankruptcy kept their jobs 
and were insulated from liability. Most importantly, it meant that 
companies that might have successfully reorganized collapsed. Even 
though a reorganization plan might be approved, the reorganized firm was 
more likely to fail again soon thereafter. For the period 1991–1996, when 
most large corporations filed for bankruptcy in Delaware, 54% of firms that 
reorganized in Delaware failed within five years, compared to 31% in New 
York and only 14% in other courts.309 When other courts copied 
Delaware’s practices, “they reproduced Delaware’s failure . . . [R]efiling 
rates in the rest of the country jumped to roughly the same level as refiling 
rates in Delaware.”310 
Of course, Delaware’s bankruptcy judges have their defenders. Even 
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LoPucki admits that competition made judges “more responsive and 
accessible. They scheduled hearings for the convenience of the lawyers and 
litigants, not merely for their own. They published rules and 
guidelines . . . . [They made] the bankruptcy reorganization process more 
predictable.”311 
Others, however, went further in defending Delaware. Robert 
Rasmussen, although acknowledging the existence of competition,312 
questions the empirical basis of LoPucki’s claim that Delaware’s practices 
led reorganized firms to fail more often. He argues that one must 
distinguish between traditional cases (where a reorganization plan is 
worked out after the firm files for bankruptcy) and pre-packaged cases 
(where the debtor and most creditors negotiate the reorganization plan 
before filing).313 For traditional cases, which are the focus of most 
bankruptcy scholarship, the failure rate of Delaware firms is not different in 
a statistically significant way from the failure rate of firms reorganizing in 
other busy districts.314 
Kenneth Ayotte and David A. Skeel Jr. argue that the apparently high 
failure rate of firms that reorganize in Delaware is not attributable to 
problematic practices of Delaware bankruptcy judges, but rather to 
selection: “Firms that are more likely to underperform in the future, all else 
equal, will rationally select a cheaper, faster bankruptcy procedure.”315 
That is, firms that are more likely to fail are more likely to choose 
Delaware. In addition, Ayotte and Skeel argue that if one uses a better 
measure of post-bankruptcy performance—earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (“EBITDA”)—rather than operating losses, 
firms that reorganized in Delaware perform as well as firms that 
reorganized elsewhere.316 
One reason that bankruptcy competition might not lead to deleterious 
effects is that creditors have some influence over where firms file for 
bankruptcy. Because the debtor will need the cooperation of creditors, 
especially secured creditors, debtors consult with creditors about where to 
file. This gives the creditors the ability to constrain managerial choices that 
would reduce firm value. Of particular importance is the emergence of 
debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing. Lenders who provide funding for 
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the firm in bankruptcy demand control over where the firm will file and 
over many decisions during the bankruptcy itself. Such lenders have an 
incentive to ensure that managers do not use the process to enrich 
themselves at the expense of creditors.317 
C.  DOMAIN NAME DISPUTE RESOLUTION318 
A more exotic example of forum selling comes from the world of 
online dispute resolution. Since 1999, any entity that registers a domain 
name must agree to resolve trademark disputes in accordance with the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”).319 Under 
that policy, registrants agree to arbitrate trademark disputes with an 
arbitration provider approved by the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (“ICANN”). A unique feature of this system is that, in 
most cases, the complainant (plaintiff) unilaterally chooses the “dispute-
resolution service provider” and the provider unilaterally chooses the 
arbitrator. That is, a trademark owner who claims that a domain name 
infringes its trademark unilaterally chooses the entity in charge of choosing 
the arbitrator. 
Although ICANN had initially certified three dispute resolution 
providers, two swiftly came to dominate the market: the National 
Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) and World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”).320 Not surprisingly, according to the first researchers to analyze 
the system, Milton Mueller and Michael Geist, trademark owners “win 
more frequently” with these two providers.321 In contrast, the dispute 
resolution provider with a lower trademark owner win rate, eResolution, 
left the market after less than two years.322 The dominant position of WIPO 
seems to have emerged after it had established a track record of ruling for 
the trademark owner.323 
The incentive to tilt law in favor of complainants is obvious. The 
dispute resolution providers are funded by fees paid by the complainant. In 
some cases, forum selling was blatant in that dispute resolution providers 
advertised their pro-complainant decisions and win rates.324 For example, 
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the NAF, one of the two dominant dispute resolution providers, sent out 
eleven press releases in mid-2001, and ten of them touted trademark owner 
victories.325 
At least in the early years of the system, the key mechanism by which 
arbitration providers favored complainants was by their selection of 
arbitrators. The roster of arbitrators associated with each provider was not 
very different, and in fact, some arbitrators were on the rosters of several 
providers. Nevertheless, the arbitration providers chose arbitrators by a 
non-random system. Analysis of arbitrator selection showed that among 
dominant providers, arbitrators who decided most often in favor of the 
complainant received more cases, while persons with reputations for 
decisions protective of domain name owners were seldom if ever selected 
as sole arbitrators. Instead, when more defendant-protective arbitrators 
were chosen, they were placed on three-person panels where their influence 
would be diluted. The use of three-person panels is relatively rare because 
it requires the domain name owner (defendant) to pay substantial fees.326 
As in other cases of alleged forum selling, the UDRP has its 
defenders. Most prominently, Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo performed 
impressive statistical analysis and concluded that the key determinant of 
arbitration provider success is efficiency, not complainant bias.327 It is 
possible that they do not find bias because they look at a broader period of 
time than earlier researchers and that the system improved over time. It is 
also possible that the monthly data that Kesan and Gallo use is too fine-
grained to find patterns because trademark owners choose providers based 
on their long-term reputations, not the prior two months’ decisions. While 
Kesan and Gallo’s analysis is impressive, it is hard to reconcile with the 
more damning (but simpler) statistics produced by earlier researchers and 
with the anecdotal evidence. It would be helpful if others analyzed the data 
to see how the simple statistics produced by Mueller and Geist can be 
reconciled with the more sophisticated analysis produced by Kesan and 
Gallo. 
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D.  COMMON LAW JUDGING IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND328 
Forum selling is not a purely contemporary phenomenon. There is 
evidence that it affected common law decisionmaking in the period 1600–
1799. During that period, litigants could choose to bring most property, 
contract, and tort cases in any of the three common law courts: Common 
Pleas, King’s Bench, and Exchequer.329 Examination of the decisions of 
these courts suggests that the judges, especially the judges of King’s 
Bench, tried to attract cases by making the law more attractive to 
plaintiffs—creating new causes of action and making it easier for plaintiffs 
to prevail. Examples of such pro-plaintiff trends include the expansion of 
the enforceability of oral contracts (indebitatus assumpsit), the narrow 
range of contract defenses (primarily fraud and duress), and the creation of 
cheaper and swifter property remedies in King’s Bench (ejectment).330 
King’s Bench, which was the most innovative and aggressive of the courts, 
rose from a backwater with a small caseload to the dominant court.331 
Common law judges had a number of incentives to want to hear more 
cases. As in any age, some judges liked the power and influence that came 
from a large and prestigious caseload. In addition, before 1799, common 
law judges were paid in part from court fees paid by litigants.332 
Like other situations involving forum selling, the common law system 
has its defenders. Adam Smith and more recently, Todd Zywicki, have 
argued that the primary effects of jurisdictional competition were 
beneficial—swifter justice.333 Given that governmental officials were often 
criticized for delay and less than diligent performance, it is possible that 
competition and pecuniary incentives provided just the right carrots to 
cause judges to improve their performance without becoming excessively 
or inefficiently pro-plaintiff. On the other hand, the pro-plaintiff character 
of the common law was sometimes so blatant that it triggered legislation 
(such as the Statute of Frauds restricting the enforceability of oral 
contracts) or the creation of defenses in Chancery (such as protections 
against double collection of debts or mistake). 
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III.  GENERALIZING FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The five case studies—patents, class actions and mass torts, 
bankruptcy, domain name dispute resolution, and common law judging in 
early modern England—share a number of common features. Most 
importantly, all involve situations in which the party initiating suit could 
choose to sue in multiple places. It is not possible to completely explain 
why some districts forum sell and others do not. Forum selling is an 
entrepreneurial activity. Just as we cannot predict which individuals will 
become successful entrepreneurs, we cannot predict which judges and 
which districts will be successful forum sellers. Nevertheless, just as one 
can identify institutions that make entrepreneurship more likely in some 
places than others, one can identify factors that make forum selling more 
likely in particular places.  
In addition, the most successful competitors seem to share some 
common characteristics. The Eastern District of Texas does not include 
major cities or industries. Similarly, most of the places that are considered 
magic jurisdictions for class actions and mass torts are largely rural. For 
example, Madison County’s largest city is Granite City, and it has a 
population of less than 30,000. Since there is so little other economic 
activity in these districts, litigation is seen as a potentially significant 
engine of economic growth. The fact that litigation looms so large in these 
districts has several important implications. It means that, if the judges do 
not attract litigation, they are unlikely to get interesting or important cases. 
It also means that, if they do attract litigation, they are likely to gain local 
prestige as persons who help lawyers and business in the district more 
generally. Conversely, lawyers and other business people are likely to 
pressure the judges to act in ways that attract and retain litigation business, 
and politicians will defend them.334 This local pressure also means that 
judges can credibly commit to maintain their favorable practices, so case 
placers can be confident that policies will not change after the case has 
been filed. Another advantage of small districts is that they have fewer 
judges, so it is easier for them to agree upon, and coordinate to implement, 
policies that attract litigation. Finally, to the extent that forum selling has 
negative consequences for defendants and others affected by litigation, 
judges in districts with smaller local economies are less likely to care 
because the individuals and businesses that are harmed are less likely to be 
local. 
The ability of small districts to compete derives from jurisdictional 
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rules that allow a court to exercise power over a nationwide problem based 
on effects in the forum, even if those effects were only a small part of the 
total harm, and even though adjudication in one forum would have 
nationwide effects. For example, patent infringement suits usually involve 
products that are distributed nationally or internationally, but the Eastern 
District of Texas asserts jurisdiction based on a small number of products 
sold there, even though a finding of infringement (or non-infringement) 
will affect products no matter where they are sold in the United States.335 
Class action and mass tort lawsuits involving nationwide plaintiffs and the 
bankruptcy of a large corporation similarly involve situations where the 
harm is nationwide or international, but even a court in a small rural county 
has the opportunity to enter a judgment binding everywhere (or at least in 
the entire United States). 
Of course, some courts that compete are not located in districts that 
are otherwise economically insignificant. Before Delaware, the Southern 
District of New York was the dominant district for large bankruptcy cases, 
and bankruptcy districts that included major cities, such as Chicago and 
Houston, copied many of Delaware’s practices in an attempt to attract (or at 
least retain) big bankruptcy cases.336 State courts in Philadelphia have 
actively and publicly adopted procedures to encourage mass tort cases, and 
the Eastern District of Virginia, which was for a time a leading competitor 
for patent cases, includes Arlington, which is in the Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area. Nevertheless, it is notable that districts that include large 
cities seem to compete less hard and are less likely to be successful. This 
may reflect the converse of the factors that make rural districts so effective. 
Judges in urban districts are likely to have interesting cases even if they do 
not actively compete. Similarly, the local bar is likely to have lucrative 
caseloads regardless of what the judges do. Others in the local economy are 
unlikely to notice whether litigation is booming. If judges do for a time 
compete, local businesses that are negatively affected may exert pressure 
for more even-handed justice, thus leading to reversal of the practices 
favorable to plaintiffs and case placers. Therefore, judges in urban districts 
seem unable to compete successfully over long periods of time. Rise and 
fall patterns are discernable with respect to mass torts in Philadelphia and 
patent cases in the Eastern District of Virginia. 
In competing, courts are likely to adopt methods that immunize their 
decisions from appellate review. Federal courts that compete need to be 
concerned that their decisions will be reversed by appellate courts that have 
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no interest in helping one district gain a disproportionate share of litigation 
and may be offended by “renegade” jurisdictions that try to do so. Thus, the 
Eastern District of Texas has focused its efforts to attract litigation on 
procedural issues, such as trial management or transfer of venue, that are 
reviewed only for abuse of discretion.337 In addition, it has focused on 
decisions that do not qualify as final judgments, such as joinder or the 
denial of summary judgment. Such decisions cannot be immediately 
reviewed and thus are unlikely to be reviewed at all because most cases 
settle.338 Similarly, in the bankruptcy context, first-day orders, decisions on 
how often to pay professionals, and other techniques Delaware used to 
attract cases are usually effectively unreviewable. In early modern England, 
the judges of King’s Bench often used “legal fictions” to attract cases 
because fictions made the record on appeal seem legally correct, and 
appellate courts were severely restricted in their ability to question facts in 
the record.339 
Another common theme is that forum selling is not inevitable, even if 
the relevant law gives plaintiffs or case placers broad choice of forum. For 
the first fifteen years after the enactment of the modern bankruptcy statute, 
no court seems to have attempted to attract cases. In addition, even when 
competition exists, not all courts compete. Only a handful of districts have 
even tried to attract patent cases.340 Competition seems to have been more 
widespread for bankruptcy cases, although even in this context only the 
District of Delaware and districts encompassing about a dozen major cities 
seem to have entered the fray.341 
In order to attract cases, courts do some things that are genuinely 
good, including increasing speed and predictability. Nevertheless, it would 
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be a mistake to think that is all that courts do to compete. Plaintiffs and 
other case placers are concerned about speed and predictability only as 
means to the end of increasing their expected recovery. Consider, for 
example, summary judgment. Summary judgment generally speeds case 
resolution and is more predictable because it involves judges rather than 
juries. Nevertheless, the Eastern District of Texas and District of Delaware 
both make it difficult for parties to get summary judgment, which primarily 
advantages defendants.342 Similarly, jurisdictions that attract class action 
and mass tort cases are those that make it easier, not harder to get to juries. 
In the bankruptcy context, low fees to professionals could be as predictable 
as high fees, but bankruptcy judges know that only the latter attract cases. 
In addition, speed is not unambiguously good. Since the plaintiff or case 
placer can prepare its case in advance of filing, but other litigants ordinarily 
cannot, tight timetables advantage plaintiffs and case placers because they 
may not give other litigants sufficient time to prepare.343 
Based on his analysis of patent and bankruptcy litigation, Jonas 
Anderson argues that forum selling is more common in areas of law with 
specialized courts or specialized judges.344 The fact that forum selling has 
occurred in American mass torts and class actions and in pre-modern 
English common law courts suggests that forum selling can occur even 
without specialized courts. In addition, specialized courts would seem to 
reduce the danger of forum selling. The existence of the Federal Circuit, a 
single appellate court for patent cases, reduces opportunities for forum 
selling by making it harder for courts to compete based on differences in 
substantive law. Anderson acknowledges this, but argues “when legal 
differences among fora are eliminated, forum shoppers turn their attention 
to administrative and procedural nuances among courts.”345 While it is true 
that the Federal Circuit makes it difficult for district courts to compete by 
offering better substantive law, this does not mean that the inability to offer 
better substantive law made competition more likely. The opposite is more 
likely. Instead, the fact that competition is so intense in bankruptcy and 
patent reflects the unusually loose jurisdiction and venue provisions 
governing these areas. These loose rules mean that patent owners and case 
placers can choose to sue or file in nearly any district, which is not true for 
plaintiffs in most areas of law. 
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IV.  SOLUTIONS 
Since a necessary prerequisite for forum selling is jurisdictional 
choice, the easiest way to restrain forum selling is to narrow the plaintiff’s 
(or case placer’s) jurisdictional choices. In fact, forum selling is relatively 
rare, in large part because in most situations, jurisdictional rules give 
plaintiffs only a few places in which they can sue. That means even a court 
that attracted all cases within its jurisdiction would still attract only a small 
fraction of all litigation. What makes the patent, bankruptcy, mass tort, and 
class action rules different is that they effectively give litigants the ability 
to sue anywhere, and thus give motivated courts the ability to attract a large 
fraction of that litigation. 
Restricting jurisdictional choice in patent litigation is relatively easy. 
Congress could amend the patent venue statute to require patent owners to 
sue in the defendant’s principal place of business or largest market. This 
solution is similar to Jeanne Fromer’s proposal “to constrain venue to 
require suit in the district of the principal place of business of any of the 
defendants.”346 She points out that her proposal would constrain forum 
shopping while fostering beneficial “clustering” of cases in districts with 
industry or technological expertise.347 Fromer’s proposal would not allow 
suit in the place of incorporation because that would “sacrifice[] the benefit 
of clustering suits by industry [and create] a megacluster of patent cases in 
the District of Delaware.”348 Forum selling suggests another reason not to 
allow suits in the state of incorporation. Since Delaware may have been a 
competitor for patent suits, allowing suits in the state of incorporation as 
well as the principal place of business would enable Delaware, a court with 
a track record of forum selling, to compete for nearly any case involving a 
large corporate defendant. 
Nevertheless, our proposal would also allow suit in the defendant’s 
largest market for the allegedly infringing product. While forcing all patent 
litigation to the defendant’s principal place of business would largely 
eliminate forum selling and the pro-plaintiff biases it causes, this could lead 
to an equally harmful pro-defendant bias. Courts and jurors in the 
defendant’s principal place of business may be inclined to favor the local 
employer. In addition, companies might strategically choose to locate their 
principal place of business in districts with a pro-defendant reputation, thus 
giving courts additional incentives to favor patent defendants.349 The 
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district that includes the largest market for the defendant’s products is 
likely to be more neutral between patentee and alleged infringer, and 
adding a single additional potential venue is unlikely to stimulate 
destructive competition among courts. 
Restricting jurisdictional choice is likely to be more effective than the 
solution advocated by Jonas Anderson. He argues that districts should be 
required to randomly assign cases to judges.350 While it is true that non-
random case assignment is one of the methods districts use to make 
themselves more attractive to patent infringement plaintiffs, it is just one 
method and banning its use is unlikely to have a large effect for two 
reasons. First, several courts that compete or have competed for patent 
litigation, including the District of Delaware and Western District of 
Pennsylvania, have always used random assignment. Second, most districts 
that compete for patent cases have relatively few judgeships, so even with 
random assignment, a litigant is still likely get a favorable judge. The 
District of Delaware, for example, has only four judges.351 The Eastern 
District of Texas is somewhat larger, with eight judgeships.352 Since a 
majority of the judges on these courts seem to support pro-patentee 
policies, requiring random assignment would only slightly increase the 
possibility that a case would be assigned to a judge not interested in 
attracting cases through pro-plaintiff decisions.353 
As discussed above, bankruptcy venue provisions are formally 
narrow, restricting suit primarily to the debtor’s principal place of business 
and place of incorporation. In practice, these criteria do not constrict where 
a large company can file for bankruptcy because case placers can choose 
the company’s place of incorporation and headquarters, as well as whether 
to have an affiliate file in a preferred forum first.354 As a result, competition 
in bankruptcy does not undermine the idea that forum selling is a 
consequence of broad jurisdictional choice and thus could be largely 
eliminated through appropriate restrictions on jurisdiction and venue. 
In fact, Lynn LoPucki argues that to eliminate competition, it would 
probably be sufficient to remove the state of incorporation and the state 
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where an affiliate had previously filed for bankruptcy from the venue 
statute.355 Others suggest that competition between districts could be made 
beneficial if firms were required to commit to a particular bankruptcy 
district while they were still healthy.356 For example, a firm might be 
encouraged to state in its corporate charter where it would file for 
bankruptcy if it got into trouble.357 In this situation, potential creditors 
could know in advance the bankruptcy court that would hear the case, and 
if the court systematically favored management or insiders—for example, 
by paying excessive fees to lawyers or selling assets to insiders at low 
prices—then creditors would demand higher interest rates. There would 
thus be market pressure for firms to choose a better bankruptcy court. In 
turn, that would encourage courts that wanted to hear more bankruptcy 
cases to make efficient bankruptcy law. 
For the moment, at least, the problem of competition for class actions 
seems to have been solved by pushing them into federal court. Of course, 
as the examples of bankruptcy and patents show, even federal courts are 
not immune from competitive pressure. Nevertheless, several features of 
federal court make competition in class actions less likely. Because class 
actions can often be filed in multiple districts, it is likely that competing 
plaintiff’s attorneys will file cases in several districts. The cases will then 
be referred to the Multidistrict Litigation Panel, which then sends all the 
related cases to a single court for pretrial proceedings. Since that single 
court is chosen by the Panel, rather than the litigants, competition is 
minimized.358 
The power of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel to assign related cases 
filed in different places to any district for pretrial processing suggests 
possible reforms for patent and bankruptcy litigation as well. Patent and 
bankruptcy cases could also be assigned to districts by a centralized 
process. For example, Jonas Anderson suggests that patent infringement 
cases be randomly assigned to judges who have indicated an interest in 
hearing patent cases.359 Similarly, Lynn LoPucki has suggested that 
Congress establish three or four bankruptcy courts for large bankrupt firms 
and that cases be assigned to the most convenient court by a judge not 
selected by anyone related to the firm. In a similar spirit, domain name 
 
 355. See generally LoPucki, supra note 11. 
 356. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum 
Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2000). 
 357. Id. at 1402. 
 358. See Bieneman, supra note 258. 
 359. Anderson, supra note 13, at 644. Anderson ultimately rejects this solution because it would 
be costly for individuals and small companies to sue far from their homes. Instead, he favors the “more 
modest fix” of randomizing within districts. Id. at 637–38.  
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disputes could be randomly assigned by ICANN to an approved provider, 
perhaps after giving both parties an opportunity to exclude one or two 
providers from consideration. The combination of random assignment with 
the exclusion of providers disfavored by either party could give providers 
incentives to compete by developing reputations for fairness, rather than 
reputations for favoring the trademark owner. 
Broad interpretations of the doctrine of general jurisdiction also have 
the possibility of generating forum selling. That danger has not 
materialized because most courts interpret general jurisdiction to apply 
rather narrowly only to the state where a corporation is incorporated or 
domiciled.360 Nevertheless, some courts have held that a corporation is 
subject to general jurisdiction where it has a factory, employs large 
numbers of people, or conducts a large amount of business.361 Such broad 
conceptions of general jurisdiction would mean that any district could 
compete for large cases by adopting plaintiff-friendly practices. 
Fortunately, recent Supreme Court cases have restricted general jurisdiction 
to the state or states where the corporation is “at home,” by which the Court 
seems to mean a small number of states, and perhaps just headquarters and 
incorporation states.362 
Another area of potential danger is federal statutes that authorize 
nationwide service of process. These statutes are sometimes interpreted to 
mean that defendants in certain causes of action, such as antitrust, 
securities, or ERISA, can be sued in any district. Such broad jurisdictional 
choice makes forum selling possible, although it does not seem to have 
materialized.363 Part of the reason may be that many of those statutes are 
interpreted narrowly to allow suit only when the defendant has contacts 
with the state in which the federal district court is located. Other courts 
allow wide jurisdictional choice only when the defendant is foreign and 
does not have contacts with any particular state. For the future, to prevent 
forum selling, Congress and the courts should make clear that plaintiffs 
cannot ordinarily sue in any district. 
 
 360. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
 361. See Klerman, Rethinking, supra note 16, at 262. 
 362. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 760–61; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2846, 2851, 2854, 2857 (2011). 
 363. One reason that forum selling does not seem to have materialized in antitrust or securities 
cases is that many such cases are subject to multidistrict litigation proceedings, which make the place 
where a case was initially filed much less important. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although forum shopping is usually analyzed as a problem created by 
strategic plaintiffs, this Article suggests that courts are sometimes a key 
part of the problem. While judges usually want to hear fewer cases and are 
motivated to apply the law even-handedly, in some circumstances, a few 
judges seek to hear more cases in order to bring prestige to themselves and 
business to local lawyers and the local economy. That is, sometimes forum 
shopping by plaintiffs leads to forum selling by judges. While some of the 
things judges do to attract cases may be beneficial, often efforts to attract 
cases favor those with the power to choose where the case will be brought. 
In the patent context, that means favoring patentees over alleged infringers. 
In the bankruptcy context, that means favoring debtors and managers over 
creditors. In the class action and mass tort context, it means favoring 
injured individuals over corporate defendants. 
Forum selling is made possible by statutes, rules, and judicial 
decisions that give plaintiffs wide choice of forum. Such jurisdictional 
choice means that motivated courts can attract litigation from all over the 
country (and potentially all over the world). Thus, the simplest way to 
prevent forum selling is to constrict jurisdictional choice. Much of the 
Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine has that effect, even though 
it was not consciously designed to prevent forum selling. The existence of 
constitutional constraints probably explains why forum selling is relatively 
rare. Conversely, the danger of forum selling helps to justify constitutional 
constraints on jurisdiction, which have been challenged as lacking doctrinal 
or pragmatic justification. Nevertheless, because jurisdictional rules, 
statutes, and constitutional doctrine have not been designed to prevent 
forum selling, there are a few areas, such as patent and bankruptcy, where 
parties have substantial jurisdictional choice and where some judges have 
distorted the law to attract cases. Of course, most judges have not 
participated in that competition, but when there is wide jurisdictional 
choice, a small number of motivated judges can have a large negative 
impact because their courts will attract a large fraction of all litigation. 
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APPENDIX 1a.  Speed in Twenty-Five Busiest Patent Districts and W.D. Pa. 
2000–2007  
District Time to 
Term.(All) 
# Trials Time to Trial Time to Term. (Tried 
Cases) 
E.D. Tex. 312 33 650 974 
D. Del. 364 86 654 1238 
C.D. Cal. 210 38 703 1048 
N.D. Cal. 309 40 855 1252 
N.D. Ill. 215 22 770 934 
D.N.J. 225 19 930 1125 
S.D.N.Y. 226 27 934 1293 
S.D. Cal. 231 11 1071 1419 
S.D. Fla. 207 14 404 573 
D. Mass. 267 30 1048 1314 
D. Minn. 247 13 881 926 
M.D. Fla. 241 15 634 911 
E.D. Mich. 270 7 945 1067 
E.D. Va. 160 21 279 414 
N.D. Ga. 235 4 1000 1332 
N.D. Tex. 227 9 818 1127 
D. Utah 261 8 436 1340 
W.D. Wash. 181 8 644 752 
D. Colo. 198 6 1103 1128 
E.D. Pa. 294 9 917 1204 
N.D. Ohio 210 3 630 797 
S.D. Tex. 264 13 731 1050 
W.D. Tex. 270 7 904 1098 
E.D.N.Y. 270 7 775 775 
W.D. Wis. 156 15 318 335 
Average Top 25 
except E.D. Tex. 239 18 766 1019 
W.D. Pa. 208 4 1436 1788 
All Districts 244 585 731 1097 
All Except       
E.D. Tex. 243 552 746 1101 
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APPENDIX 1b.  Speed in Twenty-Five Busiest Patent Districts and W.D. Pa. 
2008–6/30/2015 
District Time to Term. 
(All) 
# Trials Time to Trial Time to Term. 
(Tried Cases) 
E.D. Tex. 246 149 833 1024 
D. Del. 316 161 775 1074 
C.D. Cal. 238 41 769 929 
N.D. Cal. 272 45 857 1127 
N.D. Ill. 218 20 1165 1785 
D.N.J. 295 74 962 1106 
S.D.N.Y. 273 43 772 973 
S.D. Cal. 300 17 756 1116 
S.D. Fla. 119 13 519 751 
D. Mass. 273 25 871 1193 
D. Minn. 278 6 1271 1294 
M.D. Fla. 267 17 773 920 
E.D. Mich. 252 10 1680 1781 
E.D. Va. 182 18 404 484 
N.D. Ga. 225 6 1124 1159 
N.D. Tex. 252 12 815 885 
D. Utah 275 5 1420 1681 
W.D. Wash. 230 8 978 954 
D. Colo. 210 6 1136 1705 
E.D. Pa. 274 5 726 1030 
N.D. Ohio 207 8 846 1089 
S.D. Tex. 277 10 875 1037 
W.D. Tex. 274 6 903 1337 
E.D.N.Y. 267 3 1274 1537 
W.D. Wis. 235 23 552 729 
Average Top 25 
Except E.D.Tex. 250 24 926 1153 
W.D. Pa. 391 9 980 996 
All Districts 255 849 850 1097 
All Except  
E.D. Tex. 
257 700 858 1110 
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Notes. Unless otherwise stated, data were obtained from Lex Machina, 
www.lexmachina.com, and accessed on August 21, 2015. Lex Machina 
collects and verifies PACER data for district court patent litigation. It 
updates nightly; cleans and evaluates the raw PACER data to eliminate 
errors; indexes and tags the data; and offers various summary and analytic 
tools. See https://lexmachina.com/features/how-it-works/. Time is median 
number of days to the event. The twenty-five busiest patent districts are 
based on data from the last ten years collected by Lex Machina. Speed data 
were obtained by viewing Lex Machina’s summary page for each district. 
Date was restricted to 1/1/00 through 12/31/07 and 1/1/08 through 
06/30/15. Time to termination was determined by selecting the “cases that 
were terminated” option and identifying the median provided by Lex 
Machina (using the labels feature). Time to trial and time to termination 
(tried cases) were determined by selecting the “cases that went to trial” 
option and identifying the median for “Trial” and “Termination.” When 
there were more than ten trials, Lex Machina identified the median. If not, 
the median was hand-calculated from the data provided. For “All 
Districts,” speed data was obtained by clicking on Lex Machina’s tab 
“Cases”; selecting the “Timing” subtab; Case Type was restricted to Patent; 
Terminated Date was restricted to 1/1/00 through 12/31/07 and 1/1/08 
through 06/30/15 to obtain “time to termination (all cases)”; Trial Date was 
restricted to 1/1/00 through 12/31/07 and 1/1/08 through 06/30/15 to obtain 
“number of trial,” “time to trial,” and “time to termination (tried cases).” 
To obtain information for all districts except E.D. Tex., these steps were 
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APPENDIX 2: Summary Judgment and Transfer Rates in Top Twenty-Five 













E.D. Tex. 6421 7 43 50 0.8 434 6.8 
D. Del. 4787 13 63 76 1.6 233 4.9 
C.D. Cal. 4478 47 165 212 4.7 137 3.1 
N.D. Cal. 2673 19 124 143 5.3 89 3.3 
N.D. Ill. 2392 13 69 82 3.4 145 6.1 
D.N.J. 1986 21 47 68 3.4 67 3.4 
S.D.N.Y. 1819 12 77 89 4.9 81 4.5 
S.D. Cal. 1135 5 25 30 2.6 42 3.7 
S.D. Fla. 1124 2 28 30 2.7 63 5.6 
D. Mass. 1013 12 31 43 4.2 23 2.3 
D. Minn. 940 7 27 34 3.6 26 2.8 
M.D. Fla. 860 4 14 18 2.1 50 5.8 
E.D. Mich. 853 6 32 38 4.5 28 3.3 
E.D. Va. 819 2 35 37 4.5 115 14.0 
N.D. Ga. 781 7 9 16 2.0 34 4.4 
N.D. Tex. 774 3 14 17 2.2 50 6.5 
D. Utah 679 4 17 21 3.1 7 1.0 
W.D. Wash. 640 5 27 32 5.0 25 3.9 
D. Colo. 638 3 14 17 2.7 29 4.5 
E.D. Pa. 680 2 13 15 2.2 32 4.7 
N.D. Ohio 596 6 17 23 3.9 17 2.9 
S.D. Tex. 586 6 34 40 6.8 30 5.1 
W.D. Tex. 445 1 17 18 4.0 22 4.9 
E.D.N.Y. 568 1 13 14 2.5 24 4.2 
W.D. Wis. 424 6 44 50 11.8 54 12.7 
Top 25 except 
E.D. Tex.    31,690 207 956 1163 3.7 1423 4.5 
W.D. Pa. 303 5 8 13 4.3 9 3.0 
All Districts  46,785 295 1245 1540 3.3 2235 4.8 
All Except 
E.D. Tex. 
40,364 288 1202 1490 3.7 1801 4.5 
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Notes. The twenty-five busiest patent districts are based on data from 
the last ten years collected by Lex Machina. Data were based on 
information in Lex Machina for the time period 1/1/00 through 6/30/15 and 
accessed on August 21, 2015. Outcome information is generated by 
clicking on Lex Machina’s “Cases” tab and then choosing the “Case 
Resolutions” subtab. Results were then restricted to Case Type “Patent” 
and the date range 01/01/00 through 06/30/15. This provided the “All 
Districts” information. Data for all districts except E.D.Tex. were generated 
by restricting “Courts” to exclude the E.D. Tex. Data for specific districts 
were generated by restricting “Court” to that district. Lex Machina provides 
information on outcomes broken down by “Claimant Win”; “Claim 
Defendant Win”; “Likely Settlement”; “Procedural.” “Total Resolutions” 
was calculated by adding all of these categories together. Summary 
judgment for plaintiff is based on the “summary judgment” subcategory of 
“Claimant Win.” Summary judgment for defendant is based on the 
summary judgment subcategory of “Claim Defendant Win.” Transfers are 
based on the “interdistrict transfer” subcategory of “Procedural.” Rates 
were calculated by dividing the number by total resolutions. 
 
APPENDIX 3:  Median Time to Trial in Eastern District of Texas (Months) 
Time Period All Civil Cases Patent Cases 
10/1/01 – 9/30/02 14.0 17.5   (n=2) 
10/1/02 – 9/30/03 17.0 23.7   (n=3) 
10/1/03 – 9/30/04 15.4 21.4   (n=3) 
10/1/04 – 9/30/05 15.9 17.2   (n=3) 
10/1/05 – 9/30/06 17.7           25.2 (n=10) 
10/1/06 – 9/30/07 18.0 21.3   (n=8) 
10/1/01 – 9/30/07  
(Avg. of Medians) 
16.3   21.1 
10/1/07 – 9/30/08 18.5 23.8 
10/1/08 – 9/30/09 25.0 27.7 
10/1/09 – 9/30/10 21.7 30.5 
10/1/10 – 9/30/11 23.7 26.5 
10/1/11 – 9/30/12 24.8 32.1 
10/1/12 – 9/30/13 20.5 22.7 
10/1/13 – 9/30/14 21.9 25.8 
10/1/07 – 9/30/13  
(Avg. of Medians)  
22.3 27.0 
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 Notes. Data for all civil cases were obtained from the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/ 
FederalCourtManagementStatistics.aspx. The median is reported in months 
and in twelve-month periods ending on September 30. Because the source 
provides only yearly information, not collective information over several 
years, the 2001–2007 and 2007–2013 period information is calculated by 
averaging the yearly medians. Data for patent cases were obtained by Lex 
Machina and accessed on August 21, 2015 in a manner similar to that 
described in Appendix 1, except with different date restrictions. Prior to the 
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2008, there were ten or fewer 
patent trials in the Eastern District of Texas in each twelve-month period, 
which is arguably too low to reliably report a median. The number of trials 
is provided when ten or under. 
 
APPENDIX 4. Case Filings for All Civil Cases and Patent Cases (April 1, 
2012–March 31, 2013) 
 E.D. Tex. National Total % of Filings in the 
E.D. Tex. 
Patent 1351 5633 24.0% 
All Civil 3744 271,950 1.4% 
Percentage of Civil 
Cases that Were 
Patent Cases 
36.1% 2.1% … 
Notes. Patent data were obtained through Lex Machina and accessed 
on August 21, 2015 by clicking on the “Cases” tab and restricting to the 
date range. Eastern District patent data were obtained by then further 
restricting by district to E.D. Tex. All civil filings for both the Eastern 
District and nationwide were obtained from U.S. District Courts—Civil 
Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the Twelve Month 
Periods Ending March 31, 2012 and 2013, Federal Judicial Caseload 
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APPENDIX 5. Share of Patent Declaratory Judgment Actions in Popular 
Patent Districts (2000-06/30/15) 
District % of All National 
Patent Cases 




% of Patent Cases 
in District Filed 
as Declaratory 
Judgments 
Eastern District of Texas 15.1% 2.5% 1.3% 
District of Delaware 11.0% 6.1% 4.2% 
Central District of 
California 
9.1% 6.5% 5.5% 
Northern District of 
California 
5.6% 11.4% 15.3% 
Northern District of Illinois 4.9% 4.4% 6.9% 
District of New Jersey 4.5% 3.5% 6.0% 
Southern District of New 
York 
3.8% 3.2% 6.4% 
Southern District of 
California 
2.4% 3.2% 10.2% 
Southern District of Florida 2.2% 2.6% 9.0% 
District of Massachusetts 2.2% 3.2% 11.3% 
Nationwide Total … … 7.6% 
Notes. Raw data were obtained through Lex Machina and accessed on 
August 21, 2015 by clicking on the “Cases” tab and restricting to the Patent 
Case Type and the appropriate date range. Declaratory judgment numbers 
were then obtained by restricting by the Declaratory Judgment Case tag. 
District-specific information was obtained by further restricting to the 
appropriate district by the Courts tag. 
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